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IN TBE SUPREME COURT 
of lhe 
STATE 01' UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ( 
vs. 
) 
Ca;se No. 8868 
JAMES W. RODGERS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The defendant and Appellant will be referred to as 
defendant. The plaintiff and respondent will be referred 
to as the State. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Charles Merrifield was slhot to death on the 19th day 
of June, 1957 at the Rattle Snake mine in San Juan County, 
Utah. A Complaint was filed against James W. Rodgers on 
the 22nd day of June, 1957, which read in words and figures 
as follows, to-wit: 
"IN THE CITY COURT OF MONTICELLO 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES W. RODGERS, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SAN JUAN ) 
On the 22nd day of June, 1957, before me, Ralph J. 
Hafen, Judge of the above entitled Court City of Monti-
cello, San Juan CountY, State of Utah, personally appeared 
R. D. McAlister who, being duly sworn by me, on his oath did 
say that James W. Rodgers on the 19th day of June, 1957, 
at and in the County of San Juan, State of Utah unlawfully 
did commit the crime of murder in the manner as follows, 
to wit: that at the time and place aforesaid James W. 
Rodgers murdered Charles T. Merrifield. Contrary to the 
form of the statute in such case made and provided, and 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
/s/ R. D. McALISTER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me the day and year 
first above written. 
lsi RALPH J. HAFEN 
Judge 
I approve issuance of a "·arrant of arrest on the fore-
going complaint. 
Is! F. BENNION REDD 
County Attorney " 
On the 22nd da~· of June a \V arrant of Arrest was 
signed which rca,; in words and figures as follows, to-wit: 
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"IN THE CITY COURT OF MONffiCELLO 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JAMES W. RODGERS, 
Defendant 
WARRANT OF ARREST 
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SAN JUAN 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN 
THE STATE 
A complaint, upon oath, !having been made this day 
before me Ralph J. Hafen Judge of the above entitled Court, 
by R. D. McAl,ister that the offense of m.:arder has been 
committed, and accusing James W. Rodgers thereof; 
You are commanded to arrest the above named James 
W. Rodgers and bring him before me forthwith at my office 
in Monticello, U ta'h. 
WITNESS mY hand at Monticello, Utah this 22nd day 
of June, 1~57. 
Is! RALPH J. HAFEN 
Judge" 
The defendant, James W. Rodger,s, wa,s apprehended 
without inci•tent at Cortez, Colorado on the morning of the 
20 of June, 1957 and voluntarily returned to Monticello, 
Utah. 
On June 26, 1957 a Preliminary Hearing was had be-
fore the Honorable Ralph J. Hafen, Judge of the City Court 
at Monticello, Utah, at which time the complaint was read 
to the defendant, as appears from reading the transcript 
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of the preliminary hearing. Quoting from the transcript 
orf tlhe preliminary hearing, page 3, lines 17 through 30, 
and page 4, lines 1 through 18 : 
THE COURT: You will listen to a reading of the 
complaillJt by the acting clerk of the court. 
THE REPORTER: In the City Court of Monticello. 
State of Utah, v·s. James W. Rodgers, Defendant. Complaint. 
State of Utah, County of San Juan, ss. 
On the 22nd day of June ,1957, before me, Ralph J. Haf-
en, Judge of the above entitled Court, City of Monticello, San 
Juan County, State of Utah, personally appeared R. D. 
McAlister who, being duly sworn by me, on his oath did 
say that James W. Rodgers on the 19th day of June, 1957, 
at and in the County of San Juan, State of Utah unlawfully 
did commit the crime of murder in the manner as follows, 
to wit: That at the time and place aforesaid James W. 
Rodgers murdered Charles T. 1\/[errirfield. Contrary to the 
form of the statute in such case made and provided, and 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
/s/ R. D. McALISTER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me the day and year 
first above written. 
Is! RALPH J. HAFEN 
Judge 
I approve issuance of a warrent of arres-t on the fore-
going complaint. 
Is/ F. BENNION REDD 
County Attorney 
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THE COURT: You have listened, Mr. Rodgers, to a 
reading of the charge as s·et forth in the complaint and you 
have been charged with the crime of murder. 
Do you have an attorney? 
MR. RODGERS: I do. 
THE COURT: And is Mr. Gibson your attorney? 
MR. RODGERS: That is right." 
The Court made the following finding at the conclusion 
of the evidence at the Preliminary Hearing, see page 96, 
lines 3 through 16 of the transcript of the Hearing: 
"THE COURT: It is the finding of this Court that the 
defendant in this case - what is his full name? 
MR. REDD: James W. Rodgers. 
THE COURT: James W. Rodgers - strike that and 
let me start again. 
It is the judgement of this Court that there being 
shown by the State of Utah evidence which gives the Court 
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed in this 
County and that ~there is rewsonable cause to believe that 
the defendant in this action, James Rodgers, committed 
said crime, it is the order of the Court that he be bound 
over to the Dis•trict Court to answer to the same and for 
all further proceedings in this case." 
On the 26th day of June, 1957 the following state-
ment was typed on the back of the Complaint: 
"It appearing to me that the offense in witlhin 
Complaint mentioned has been committed and that 
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there i1s sufficient cause to believe the within named 
Defendant, James W. Rodgers, guilty thereof, I order 
that 'he be held to answer to the same and he is hereby 
committed to the Sheriff of the County of San Juan, 
Stllite of Utah, without bail pending further proceed-
ings in the District Court of San Juan County, State 
of Utah. 
Is! RALPH J. HAFEN 
Judge 
Dated: June 26, 1957." 
On the 26th day of June an information was prepared 
by the District Attorney of the Seventh Judicial District, 
which read in words and figures as follows, to-wit: 
"INFORMATION 
James W. Rodgers having been on the 26th day of 
June, 1957, by Ralph J. Hafen, Judge of the Monticello 
Oity Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah, duly 
committed to answer to the crime of murder in the first 
degree, is accused by Boyd Bunnell, District Attorney of 
the Seventh Judicial District, of said crime committed as 
follows: 
That said Defendant, on or about the 19th day of 
June, 1957, murdered Charles T. Merrifield. 
Is! BOYD BUNNELL 
District Attorney 
The following witnesses testified for the State at the 
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Preliminary hearing: 
D. B. Ingram, Moab, Utah 
Harold E. Pickens, Moab, Utah 
'I'homas M. Thompson, Moab, Utah 
Ben R. Goodnight, Moab, Utah 
Chauncey E. Black, Blanding, Utah 
Seth F. Wright, Monticello, Utah" 
On the 6th day of August, 1957 the defendant was 
brought before the Seventh Judicial District Court in and 
for San Juan County, Utah for arraignment, the transcript 
of which reads in part as follows: 
·Quoting from page 2, lines 28 through 30, and page 3, 
lines 1 through 30, and page 4, lines 1 through 12. 
"MR. GIBSON: If Your Honor please, we move that 
the Information be quashed on the grounds that this De-
fendant hasn't had a preliminary hearing un the charge of 
first degree murder. 
THE COURT. You want to argue the motion? 
MR. GIBSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, I will set it down for argu-
ment at 3:30 p. m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may 
be heard, if that is agreeable to you. 
(Further proceedings continued until 3:30 o'clock p. m.) 
THE COURT: In case No. 243 there is a motion to 
quash the Information for failure to state what? 
MR. GIBSON: For the reason that the Defendant hasn't 
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had a preliminary hearing on the first degree murder 
charge. 
THE COURT: Very well, I will hear your argument. 
(Counsel for the Defendant and the State made oral 
arguments to the Court.) 
THE COURT: Court is in session and the record may 
show that the accused and his counsel and counsel for the 
State are here. The motion to quash the Information upon 
the ground that the Defendant has had no preliminary 
hearing on the charge stated in the Information is denied 
and overruled. Now are you ready to plead? 
MR. GIBSON: We are ready to plead, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step forward, Mr. Rodgers. 
Now under the old, under the old code we, if you desired 
to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity you had 
to so state. I don't think that that is required now, but I 
think that you merely need to announce your intention tore-
ly upon insanity as a defense, but if you want to make your 
plea that way -
MH. GIBSON: Well, I have checked that, if Your 
Honor please, and I am inclined to think the law is as you 
say, but to be sure about it and safe-
THE COURT: You want to plead as the old statute 
required. 
MR. GIBSON: Yes, I want. 
THE COURT: To the Information that has been read 
to you, what i~ rour plea, guilty or not guilty? 
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MR. RODGERS: Not guilty. 
MR. GIBSON: And not guilty by reason of insanity." 
On the 7th day of December, 1957 the Defendant filed 
a Motion to Quash the Information or in Lieu Thereof to 
Amend Same, which said motion reads in words and fig-
ures as follows, to-wit: 
"IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES W. RODGERS, 
Defendant. 
CRIMINAL NO. 243 
MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION OR IN 
LIEU THEREOF TO AMEND SAME 
The defendant James W. R'Odgers by and through his 
attorneys A. Reed Reynolds and Robert H. Ruggeri moves 
the Court for an order Quashing the Information or in Lieu 
Thereof fior an order amending same for the reason and 
upon the grounds herein set 'fortJh as follows: 
1. That said Information does not charge the defendant 
with the commissi1on of the o:ffense charged in :the COJYloo 
plaint, upon Which the preliminary hearing was held, and 
for which he was bound over to the District Court for trial. 
2. That the Court trying the cause has no jurisdiction 
of the offense charged in tihe Information or of the person 
of the defendant. 
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3. That an Information was filed without the defendant 
first having had or waived a preliminary examination on 
the ofrfense charged in the information. 
4. That the prosecuting attorney had no authority to 
file the Information covering the offense charged in the 
Information. 
That in lieu of quashing the information that the same 
be amended by order of this Court to conform to the of-
fense charged in the complaint, upon which the preliminary 
hearing was based, and to conform to the offense for which 
the defendant was bound over to the District Court to 
stand trial. 
This motion is based upon the complaint, transcript 
of the preliminary hearing, the Information, and any and all 
other proper statutes, records and files thereto appertaining. 
Dated this 7th day of December, A. D., 1957. 
A. REED REYNOLDS and 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
I sl Robert H. Ruggeri 
Is/ A. Reed Reynolds 
NOTICE OF MOTION 
TO: The Honorable Boyd Bunnell District Attorney for 
the Seventh Judicial District. 
Please take notice that the undersigned will bring the 
above Motion on for hearing before the Court at the court-
room thereof in the Court House at Monticello, San Juan 
County, State of Utah, on the lOth day of December, A. 
D., 1957. at the hour of 10:00 o'clock A. M., or as soon 
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thereafter as counsel can be heard. 
Dated this 7th day of December, A. D., 1957. 
A. REED REYNOLDS and 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
Is/ Robert H. Ruggeri 
Is/ A. Reed Reynolds 
Attorneys for the defendant" 
That on December 11, 1957 the above entitled case 
came on regularly for hearing at which time oral argu-
ments were presented to the Court on the defendant's 
motion to quash the information or in lieu thereof to amend 
same. and the Court made its ruling which appears in the 
reporter's transcript of the trial as follows: 
Page 4, lines 13 through 30, and page 5, lines 1 
through 3. 
"THE COURT: I have heretofore considered the pro-
nouncement of our Supreme Court on this prorl~m. I may 
not :have made the right interpretation of what they have 
said nor reached the right conclusion with respect to it, 
and if I am in error, of course the Supreme Court will 
correct me. I have already ruled in this case on this propo-
sition. And taking 77-21-38 and giving it what I think is 
the plain meaning of t 1hat statute I reached the conclusion 
that the complaint charged murder in the first degree. 
Because the section says plainly that where an offense 
is divided in degrees, a charge that the offense was com-
mitted includes all of the degrees. So I conclude that the 
complaint in this case charged murder in the first degree 
and that the information doesn't charge a crime on which 
he hasn't had a preliminary hearing. And what I have said 
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applies to other items specified in the motion. I therefore 
deny the motion. I hope, however, gentlemen, that if there is 
a verdict that you don't like in this case that you will gu 
up to the Supreme Court and see what they have to say 
about it. Trial courts make errors and I may have made one 
here. I'if I havE, I want to be corrected, but that is my best 
judgment, gentlemen." 
The defendant then made an objection to the intro-
duction of any testimony with respect to first degree 
murder. 
See page 5, lines 25 through 30, and page 6, line 1 of 
the transcript of the trial: 
"MR. REYNOLDS: Your Honor, may the record also 
show that the Defendant makes an objection to the intro-
duction of any testimany with respect to first degree 
murder, and that that objection will continue throughout 
the entire trial? 
THE COURT: You may have that objection, and the 
objection is overruled." 
i 
On the 14th day of December, 1957, the jury returned 
a verdict of Guilty 10f Murder in the First Degree without 
a recommendation of leniency. 
On December 19, 1957, the defendant made a Motion 
in Arrest Otf Judgment and Motion for New Trial, which 
read in words and figures as f10llows: 
"IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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MOTION IN ARREST 
OF JUDGMENT 
Criminal No. 243 
Comes now the Defendant and moves the above en-
titled Court for an order arresting judgment in this case 
pursuant to Sections 77-34-1 and 77-35-10, Utah Code An-
notated 1953 on the following grounds. 
1. That the facts proved at the trial of this matter do 
not constitute a public ofrfense for the reason that the De-
fendant was in such a mental condition as to proclude him 
from forming the required specific intent. 
2. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-35-10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, the judgment should be arrested for 
the following reasons to wit: 
(a) That the Defendant is insane, and, 
(b) That the above entitled Court was without jur-
isdiction to try the Defendant for the crime of 
Murder in the First Degree because the Defendant 
was charged in the Complaint with what consti-
tutes the crime of Murder in the Second Degree; 
that the preliminary hearing was based upon said 
Complaint and that the Defendant was bound over 
by the Committing Magistrate to stand trial for 
the offense stated in the Complaint, to wit: Mur-
der in the Second Degree. 
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Dated this 19th day of December, 1957. 
A. REED REYNOLDS AND 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Moab, Utah 
By Is/ A. Reed Reynolds 
Received a copy of the foregoing Motion in Arrest of 
Judgment this 19th day of December, 1957. 
Is/BOYD BUNNELL 
District Attorney " 
"IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plainti'ff, 
vs. 
JAMES W. RODGERS, 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR NE'V TRIAL 
Criminal No. 243 
Comes now the Defendant and moves the above en-
titled Court for an order granting him a new trial on the 
following grounds, to wit: 
That the verdict rendered in this case is not support-
ed by the evidence and is in fact contrary to the evidence. 
Dated this 19th day of December, 1957. 
A. REED REYNOLDS AND 
ROBERT H. RUGGERI 
Attorneys for Defendent 
Moab, Utah 
By I sf A. Reed Reynolds 
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Received a copy of the foregoing Motion for New Trial 
this 19th day of December, 1957. 
Is/ BOYD BUNNELL 
District Attorney " 
The Motion in Arrest of Judgment and the Motion for 
a New Trial were argued and overruled. 
See Page 291, lines 24 through 30, and page 292, lines 
1 through 11 of the transcript of the trial: 
"(At this Ume the Court heard the oral arguments of 
counsel on the motion for a new trial.) 
THE COURT: The motion for a new trial is denied 
and overruled. Do you want to argue your motion in 
arrest of judgment? 
MR. REYNOLDS: I might just point out, if the Court 
please, that the ground number 1 stated in the motion is bas-
ed on substantially the same matter I argued with respect to 
the motion for a new trial. And the second ground set forth 
in the motion in arrest of judgement is with respect to the 
matter once directed to this Court by Mr. Ruggeri and my-
self and that goes to the Complaint and the crime charged 
at that time and also the [orm of the Information charging 
first degree murder, and the Court has heard our argument 
in connection with that. 
THE COURT: The motion in arrest of judgment is 
denied and overruled. We will be in recess for five minutes 
and I would like to confer with counsel in chambers." 
Sentence was pronounced on Defendant. See page 292, 
lines 14 through 30, page 293, lines 1 through 30, and page 
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294, lines 1 through 6 of the transcript of the trial as 
follows: 
"THE COURT: You will stand before the Court, James 
W. Rodgers. James W. Rodgers, you are charged by an 
Information filed in this Court with commission of the 
crime of murder. It was charged in this Infonnation that 
on or about the 19th day of June 1957, within this county 
you murdered Charles Merrifield. To that Information you 
entered a plea of not guilty. You were without funds to 
employ counsel for your defense and upon that being made 
to appear to the satiSifaction of the Court I appointed the 
two gentlemen that now stand by you as your counsel to 
defend you. A jury was impaneled and sworn and heard 
the evidence in support of the Information and in your 
defense. That jury returned a verdict finding you guilty 
of murder in the first degree without a recommendation 
of imprisonment for life. In that situation, the Court is 
bound by law to impose upon you the death penalty. Have 
you any legal reason tJ state why the judgment and sent-
ence af the Court should not be pronounced? You may ans-
wer that, gentlemen. 
MR. ·RUGGERI: Do we have? Do you have anything 
to ~say? 
MR. RODGERS: No. 
MR. REYNOLDS: No, Your Honor. 
MR. RUGGERI: No, Your Honor. No, Your Honor, we 
don't have any reason. 
THE COURT: Do you have anything you wish to 
direct to the Court? 
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MR. RODGERS: Only that the execution take place 
as quickly as possible. 
THE COURT: Under the law :of this State, one con-
victed of the crime of murder in the first degree without 
a recommendation of imprisonment for life has the right 
to make an election between hanging and shooting as a 
means of having his life extinguished. What election do 
you make? 
MR. RODGERS: Shooting. 
THE COURT: The judgment and sentence of the Court 
is that you, James W. Rodgers, be executed by shooting. I 
fix the 17th day of March 1958, at sunrise on that day as the 
date for y:our execution, and you are committed to the 
custody of the Sheriff of this county who is charged with 
the execution orf this sentence. Now I take it if there are 
nro objections, no good objection, this man may be taken 
forthwith to the State Prison. This execution is to occur 
within the outer walls of the State Prison. 
MR. REYNOLDS: I don't know of any reason why he 
shouldn't be. 
THE COURT: I have fixed this date as the 17th day 
of March to give your counsel ample time to prepare an 
appeal to the Supreme Court. They advised me that you 
don't want to appeal. The Oourt is of the opinion, however, 
tha.t in such a case as this that an appeal should be had so 
tha:t what we have done here in this courtroom may be 
screened very carefully by a higher Court than this. You 
are committed to the custody of the Sheriff. Is there any-
thing further that you wish to direct to the Court? Court 
is in recess." 
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Record on appeal was filed April 1, 1958. 
POINTS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL 
Defendant, appellant herein, declares that the lower 
court erred in this cause and that its decision should be 
reversed because: 
POINT I 
The complaint charged the Defendant with "murder" 
and he was bound over to stand trial for "murder" which 
is a definitive term not constituting a public offense under 
the laws of this state, under these circumstances a con-
viction of murder in the first degree is contrary to and in 
violation of the laws of the State of Utah and the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah and of the Constitution of the 
United States of America. 
POINT II 
That the Court erred in not granting Defendant's 
motinn to quash the information made at the time of ar-
raignment and before plea on the grounds that the De-
fendant did not have a preliminary hearing on the charge 
of first degree murder and the Court therefore was with-
out jurisdiction to hear the case. 
POINT III 
That the Court erred in ~overruling the Defendant's 
motion to quash the information or in lieu thereof to amend 
same to conform tYJ the charge that was made in the original 
complaint and the charge for which the Defendant was 
bound over by the committing magistrate to stand trial. 
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POINT IV 
That the court erred in overruling the Defendant's 
objection to the introduction of any testimony with respect 
to first degree murder. 
POINT V 
That the Court erred in overruling Defendant's mo-
tion in Arrest of Judgment based on the following grounds: 
(a) That the Defendant is insane, and, 
(b) That the Trial Oourt was without jurisdiction to 
try the Defendant for the crime of murder in the 
first degree because the Defendant was charged 
in the complaint with what constitutes the crime 
of murder in the second degree; that the prelim-
inary hearing was based upon said complaint and 
that the defendant was bound over by the com-
mitting magistrate to stand trial for the offense 
stated in the complaint to wit: Murder in the 
second degree. 
POINT VI 
That the Court erred in overruling the Defendant's 
motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict 
rendered in this case is not supported by the evidence and 
is in fact contrary to the uncontradicted evidence that the 
defendant was suffering ff!om an organic mental disorder 
which rendered him insane and incapable of controlling his 
actions. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
"76-1-11. "CRHJ.IE" DEFINED. - A crime or public 
offense is an act committed or omitted inviolation of a law 
forbidding or commanding it, and to which is annexed, 
upon Clonviction, any of the following punishments: 
(1) Death. 
(2- Imprisonment. 
(3) Fine. 
( 4) Removal from office. 
(5) Disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of 
honor, trust or profit in this state." 
"76-30-1. "MURDER" DEFINED. - Murder is the 
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethoug·ht. 
"76-30-3. DEGREES OF MURDER. - Every murder 
perpetrated by poison, lying in ,,-ait or any other kind of 
wilful, deliberate, malic~ous and premeditated killing; or 
committed in the perpetratiJn of, or attempt to perpetrate, 
any arson, rape, burglary or robbery : or perpetrated from 
a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect 
the death of any human being other than the one who is 
killed; or perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the 
lives of others and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless 
of human life; - is murder in the first degree. Any other 
homicide c10mmit h'd under such circumstances as would 
have constituted murder at common law is murder in the 
second degree." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
"76-30-4. PENALTY FOR MURDER.- Every person 
guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or, 
upon the recommendation of the jury, may be imprisoned 
at hard labor in the state prison for life, in the discretion 
of the court. Every person guilty of murder in the second 
degree shall be imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison 
for a term which shall be not less than ten years and which 
may be for life." 
(a) Constitutional Provisions 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION provides: 
Article V of the Amendments: 
"No persron shall be held to answer for a capitol, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or in-
dictment of a grand jury; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offense and be twice put in jeopardy of life 
and limb; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
withouf due process of law." 
I 
Article VI of the Amendments: 
"In all criminal prosecuHons, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation;" 
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH provides: 
Article 1 Section 12 
"In criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testirfy in his, own behalf, 
and be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have 
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c:ompulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses 
in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an im-
partial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed and the right to appeal 
in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not 
be compelled to give evidence against himself; and a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her ·husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense." 
It is the contention of this Defendant that the legis-
lature in dividing murder into first degree murder and sec-
Dnd degree murder and prescribing to the respective penalties 
therefor has created two crimes, the first of which necessar-
ily includes the second as a lessor included offense. However, 
tfue first just as certainly is not included in the second. This 
contention is born out by the Supreme Court of Utah in the 
case of State v. Avery, Supreme Court of Utah, 125 P. 2d 
803. The Defendant in the Avery case was accused in tihe In-
formation of murder in the first degree and made the con-
tention that under the laws of this state, there was no such 
crime as murder in the first degree. In its determination, 
the Court, speaking through Judge Keller, DL:\rict Judge, 
used the following language. 
"Sec. 103-1-11 defining "crinw"; Sec. 103-28-1 defin-
ing "murder"; See. 103-28-3 diYiding murder into two de-
grees and defining eac·h; and See. 103-28-4 prescribing 
penalty for fir~i and second degree murder. 
The provisions of these sections are interrelated and in-
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terdependent, so to speak, and from them we may make a 
number of c·onclusions, neither of which bears out the con-
tention of the appelant. We may logically say that murder 
is a crime because it is an act punishable by death, or, upon 
recommendation of a jury, impriHonment for life, if of the 
first degree; or by imprisonment for a term not less than 
ten years and which may be r.for life, if of the second de-
gree. Or, it is equally sound to say that the three sections 
considered together create two crimes; Murder in the first 
degree, because a punishment by death or life imprisonment 
is provided for the killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought, committed under the circumstances or hav-
ing the qualities of premeditation and deliberation provided 
in the first sentence of 103-28-3; murder in the second de-
gree, because a punishment of imprisonment of not less 
than ten years and which may be for life for the killing of 
a human being with malice aforethought, where the cir-
cumstaces of aggravation which are present in murder of 
the first degree are absent, and under such circumstances 
as would have constituted murder at common law. But 
whether we consider murder in the first degree as only a 
grade or degree of murder, or as a separate crime, it} is 
nevertheless a crime as defined by Section 103-1-11, supra." 
In the Avery case, unlike the case at hand, the Court 
points out, at page 805 - By the recital that the defendant 
was accused of murder in the first degree, the accuser 
made the informati·on definite and certain as to the pun-
ishment that would be demanded. 
Under the constitutional provisions, as under the old 
common law, a person accused of a crime is entitled to be, 
at all stages of the proceedings, advised of the crime with 
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which he is charged . This principle was followed in 
People vs. Hill, Supreme Court of Utah, 3 U 334 3P 75. On 
page 78 of the Pacific He porter, the Court state as follows: 
"Section 158 of that act declares that the indictment 
is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom, among other 
things not called in question here, that the act or omission 
charged as the offense is clearly and distinctly set forth, 
without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable the 
court to understand what is intended, and to pronounce 
judgment, upon conviction, according to the right of the 
case. It is sufficient if the charge be stated with s·o much 
certainty that the defendant may know what he is called 
upon to answer, and the court how to render judgment. In 
other words, substantial justice should be more sought 
after than artificial nicety. 
"Even under the above liberal rule, laid down by the 
legislature as our guide in determining its sufficiency, it 
is the duty of the prosecution to so frame every indictment 
as to apprise the defendant, with a reasonable degree of 
certainty, 10f the character of the charge preferred against 
him. The absence of a direct allegation of anything essen-
tial in the description of the substance, character, or man-
ner of the crime, cannot be supplied by intendment. It is 
as much an essential requisite, under our criminal practice 
act, as it ever was, that all matter material to constitute 
the particular crime charged should be alleged with such 
positiveness and distinctness as not to need the aid of in-
tendment or implication. All this is embraced in the funda-
mental declaration that it is the right of eYery person ac-
cused 'Of a crime to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the aecusation. These rules do not require any hypercritical 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
construction and interpretation of an indictment on the 
part of the court." 
Stated in another way, it is the defendant Rodgers' 
contention any charge against any defendant must con-
tain such facts as to accomplish the following objects: 
1. To completely and fully advise the Defendant of 
the crime with which he is charged so that he can prepare 
his defense ; 
2. To protect the Defendant in the event he is again 
placed in jeopardy for the same offense or crime ; and, 
3. To sufficiently advise the Court in order that it may 
render proper judgment and sentence in the event the 
Defendant is found guilty. 
In the case of People vs. Bogdanoff, 256 New York 16, 
171 N. E. 890, 69 A. L. R. 1378, the Court said on page 
1382 of 69 A. L. R. as follows: 
"In this jurisdiction the courts have used a similar 
test in determining the sufficiency of indictments. In 
People vs. Farson, 244 N. Y. 413, 417, 155 N. E. 724, 
725, the court said, per Pound, J.: 'The indictment is 
sufficient, if it identifies the charge against the de-
fendant, so that his conviction or acquittal may pre-
vent a subsequent charge for the same offense; notifies 
him of the nature and character of the crime charged 
against him to the end that he may prepare his de-
fense; and enables the court upon conviction to pro-
nounce judgment according to the right of the case.' 
In other jurisdictions the test has been at times form-
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ulated in other manner, but the test has been essen-
tially the same." 
It will be noted in the Bogdanoff case unlike the case 
at bar, that the indictm·ent charged the accused with 
"murder in the first degree, contrary to the Penal Law, 
Section 104.4." The Court considered that the defendant 
was not in actual doubt as to the act to be proved against 
him. In doing so, however, the Court disapproved of the 
form of indictm·ent and indicated in other cases it might 
be declared insufficient. 
Note the language of the Court found at page 1387 
of 69 A. L. R. 
"The new forms may at times prove unwise. Doubt-
less if district attorneys insist upon using the form 
employed here, they will at times be unable to meet 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the description of a 
crime. Extraneous evidence may still leave uncertain 
at times whether an indictment for 'murder' or 'lar-
ceny' covers one crime or several. The evidence pre-
sented to t.he grand jury might cover several connected 
homicides or a series of defalcations with nothing to 
demonstrated which crime ·of the series \Yas intended 
to be the subject of the charge. Then the courts will 
be compelled to discharge the accused. Too often the 
courts are called upon to po:nt out that innovation 
does not necessarily imply improvement. "·ith equal 
t~af'e and with greater certa :nt~· the district attorney 
might have used, if he had chosen, a more precise form 
of indictment not subject to any possible claim that 
the indictment did not describe the same crime covered 
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by the bill of particulars. There must in every case be 
identity of accusation, and the indictment must des-
cribe the crime upon which the accused is held. It is 
the duty of the district attorney to formulate that des-
cription with such precision that it cannot be success-
fully challenged." 
In the case of State v. Spencer, Supreme Court :of Utah, 
121 P. 2d 912 on petition for rehearing the court said: 
"(1-3) The issues established by an information or 
a complaint and the plea of not guilty thereto consti-
tute the foundation of each criminal trial. Upon those 
issues the relevancy of the proffered evidence is de-
termined, such for instance as the question of the rel-
evancy of the facts, ultimate or probative, set out in 
the bill of particulars. Under section 105-21-10, Chap-
ter 118, Laws of Utah 1935 (our new code of criminal 
procedure), those issues are used to determine the suf-
ficiency or the consistency of the particulars outlined 
in the bill of particulars. In the recent case of State 
v. Hill, Utah, 116 P. 2d 392, 397, we said: 'It is ele-
mental that where a bill of particulars is furnished it 
may not set out a different crime than that charged in 
the information.' If, then, the information is indefinite 
as to the offense charged it is :of no help in deciding 
those questions of the relevancy of evidence or those 
questions of the application of section 105-21-10, supra. 
"Our penal code defines certain offenses in general 
terms: Murder, section 103-28-1; manslaughter, 103-
28-5; larceny, 103-36-1; perjury, section 2, Chapter 
134, Laws of Utah 1937- there may be others. Under 
each are set out, either as degrees of the general cla:ss 
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!Or designated by individual names, the offenses to 
which specific penalties a r .e attached, the 
penalties being graded in severity according 
to the seriuosness of the particular degree, 
Assume that I am bound over to stand trial for murder 
in the second degree. The district attorney files against 
me an informati-on charging as follows: E. P. murdered 
C. D. ( see form 'murder', section 105-21-47, Chapter 
118, Laws of Utah 1935). Assume that upon the face 
of that information there are no words limiting 'mur-
dered' to either degree. At m:J~ trial the prosecution 
offers evidence of murder in t:1e first degree. I object 
upon the ground that the offense with which I am 
charged is murder in the second degree. But the issue 
established by my plea of not guilty to the charge in 
that information is not limited to either degree, and 
is broad enough to include both. The allegations of that 
information are of no aid to a s:olution of the question 
raised by my objection. No particular offense has been 
charged against me. There is no punishment for mere-
ly the general definition of murder. An accused is not 
found guilty of a clas~ of oifenses, but of one of the 
class (see section 103-:25-9, Chapter 122. Laws of Utah 
1935, hereinafter discu.3secl). This Spencer case paral-
lels my illustration, substituting the offense of perjury 
for that of murder." 
"Assume an accused is bound over to stand trial 
for murder in the first degree. The inf'Ormation filed 
charges the offense b~· general definition, to wit, mur-
der - no degree is mentioned. A bill of particulars is 
furnished. InadYertently the prosecution omits some 
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of the facts which it believes will support first degree 
murder. This results in the bill supporting only mur-
der in the second degree. The accused moves to quash 
the information on the ground that the facts set out 
are not sufficient to support murder in the first de-
gree. The prosecution, discovering the error, moves 
for permission to include the additional facts, con-
tending that they have charged the greater offense. 
Section 105-21-10, supra, requires a compadson of the 
bill with the information to determine the sufficiency 
of the former. Such a comparison in this assumed case 
is of no aid to a solution of these motions. The infor-
mation, if good at all, is good for either degree of the 
offens'e, but which one is intended is not indicated. 
"(5) The information or the complaint, as the case 
may be, should stand upon its own feet. Until a par-
ticular offense as distinguished from the general def-
inition of the class of offenses, is charged, the ac-
cused should be under no obligation to demand a bill 
of particulars at the risk of waiving some of his rights 
by failure to make such demand. Incidently, of the 
bill of particulars was contemplated as the means of 
supplying elementary defects in the information, then 
of what use are sections 105-21-12 to 16, both inclusive, 
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1935? These sections cover 
matters of time, place, value or price, and ownership. 
This brings me to a discussion of certain sections of tlhis 
new code upon which respondent sem's to place con-
siderable reliance. 
Under the old form of pleading, facts were alleged 
directed to the particular degree of the offense, wheth-
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er named as a degree or by an individual name. The 
objection to the old form of pleading was its verbosity 
and complexity. See the quotations in State v. Hill, 
supra. To avoid such pleading, the legi~Slature adopted 
the simple form of pleading of Chapter 118, supra. 
In adopting that chapter, however, the legislature 
had no intention of permitting the prosecution to jeop-
ardize the accused's rights by evasiveness nor vacil-
lation. The accused is an inocent man. His prosecution 
-and the prosecutor-should be impartial. It is as much 
the duty of the prosecution to recognize his innocence 
as it is to accomplish a conviction, if the facts justify 
it. The code of criminal procedure is not intended as 
a substitute for insufficient facts. 
Section 105-21-8 of Chapter 118 permits charging 
the offense by name, by definition, or by section or 
subsection number. These methods of pleading may be 
accompHshed by referring to the offense by the name 
given to the degree, by defining the degree :of the of-
fense, or by referring to the section and subsection 
number of the degree of the defense. For all practical 
purposes it is no more verbose nor complex to refer to 
to the offense as murder in the second degree than 
to !Say merely murder - the former has the advantage 
of being definite in substance and as to penalty." 
"Are the forms given in section 105-21-47 to be used 
blindly, or are they to be used with modification or 
limitation as our penal code or the rights of the ac-
cused may require? The latter seems the sensible con-
clusion to reach. Again I invite attention to sections 
105-21-12 to 16 indu~in.'. These ~'ections imply the use 
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of more particularity than is required by the forms 
found in section 105-21-47. I am of the opinion that 
these forms are merely exemplary, and are not in-
tended as sufficient if they do not include the elements 
or the name of the particular offense defined in the 
penal code, for which a penalty is provided." 
"(7) In 27 Am. Jur. 655 at page 666, section 105, 
there is a brief discussion of such sections as this. 
Reference is made to the case of State v. Roy, 40 N. 
M. 397, 60 P. 2d 646, 658, 110 A. L. R. 1. In New 
Mexico the information and the bill of particulars are 
considered together to determine the offense charged. 
In this cited case the offense charged is murder in 
the first degree. Speaking of a \Section of their rules of 
practice similar to the section of our code quoted above, 
the court said: 'We have held that the charge of first 
degree murder includes second degree murder and vol-
untary manslaughter. Under the present practice an 
information in one count charging murder in the first 
degree includes therein murder in the second degree 
and voluntary manslaughter.' Such a statement does 
not answer the question of how to charge only the 
lesser degree in an information - may it be charged 
simply as murder, or should it be charged as murder 
in the second degree? If the former is to be the inter-
pretation, then one is met with the uncertainties and 
and indefinitness I have illustrated and discussed in 
this opinion; not to mention the grave question of 
whether or not section 105-21-38 quoted above does 
away with due process for the accused. I have in mind 
the principles applied in cases where state legislatures 
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sought to eliminate the necessity of supporting en-
hanced penalties by pleading, and which efforts of the 
legislatures have been held unconstitutional. One of 
those cases from Massachusetts (Com. v. Harrington, 
130 Mass. 35) is cited in the annotation to 58 A. L. R. 
20, at page 67. This section 105-21-38 should be lim-
ited to the meaning given to it by the New Mexico 
eourt - that when the greater offense is charged it 
includes the lesser without specific allegation of the 
latter. 
The penalty attached to an offense is of importance 
to the accused. It may mean the difference between 
prison and jail for him; it may mean the difference 
between a felony and a misdemeanor; or it may de-
termine his right to bail (105-44-3 and 4, R. S. U. 1933). 
In cases calling for enhanced penalties for habitual 
criminals the authorities uphold the neces·sity of plead-
ing to support the additional penalty. 25 Am. Jur. 273 
secti:on 26; 14 R. C. L. 190 section 366; and the anno-
tations in 58 A. L. R. 20, at page 64; 82 A. L. R. 366, 
and 116 A. L. R. 229. In the forms of 104-21-47, supra, 
is one for habitual criminals, setting out pleading of 
the previous conviction. The accused is as much in-
terested in the initial penalty as he is in an enhanced 
penalty. It would seem, then, that if the enhanced 
penalty must be supported by a pleading indicating 
that such a penalty is in order in a particular case, the 
initial penalty should also be so supported. But it is 
not so support~d if the accused is unable to determine 
from the information or the complaint which penalty 
is applicable to the ca -:;e. 
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(8) Respondent cites section 105-25-9, Chapter 122, 
Laws of Utah 1935. It reads: 'Where an information 
or indictment charged an offense which is decided into 
degrees without specifying the degree, if the defendant 
pleads guilty generally the court shall, before accepting 
the plea, examine witnesses to determine the degree 
of the offense of which the defendant is guilty.' 
This section is not evidence that the legislature 
thought the degree of crime was only material when it 
ca:me time to impose sentence. The section provides 
that befnre the plea is accepted - not before penalties 
are imposed - the degree of the offense must be de-
termined. It is a strange thought, indeed, that an in-
formation charging an offense by general definition 
is not sufficient to support a plea of guilty where there 
is no controversy between the parties, and yet, that 
same information is sufficient to support a plea of not 
guilty where there is a controversy between the 
parties, which controversy may raise many questions 
the solution of which depends upon the degree of the 
offense intended to be charged. It is not sufficient to 
answer that section 105-25-9, supra, was passed to 
prevent an accused from being placed twice in jeopardy 
for the same offense. The accused is as greatly con-
cerned about his life or liberty being jeopardized once 
as he is about the possibility of a second offense. This 
section is rather srtrong evidence that in the eyes of 
the legislature pleading by general definition was not 
considered sufficient foundation for a trial and con-
viction of an accused. 
In conclusion I quote from the prevailing opinion in 
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People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N. E. 890, 895, 
69 A. L. R. 1378, cited in the case of State v. Hill, 
supra, upholding the short form of pleading: 'The new 
forms may at tlmes prove unwise. Doubtless if dist-
rict attorneys insist upon using the form employed 
here, they will at times be unable to meet a challenge 
to the sufficiency of the description of a crime. Ex-
traneous evidence may still leave uncertain at times 
whether an indictment for 'murder' or 'larceny' covers 
one crime or several. The evidence presented to the 
grand jury might cover several connert.oo homicides 
or a series of defalcations with nothing to demonstrate 
which crime of the series was intended to be the sub-
ject of the charge. Then the courts will be compelled 
to discharge the accused. Tho often the courts are call-
ed upon to point out that innovation does not neces-
sarily imply improvement. 'Vith equal ease and with 
greater certainty the district attorney might have 
used, iJf he had chosen, a more precise form of indict-
ment not subject to any possible claim that the in-
dictment did not describe the same crime covered by 
the bill of particulars. There must in every case be 
identity of accusation, and the indictment must des-
cribe the crime upon which the accused is held.' " 
It is the further contention of the defendant Rodgers 
that if any interpretation at all can be placed on the charge 
that was made against the defendant in the complaint by 
use of the definitive term "murder'' it must necessarily be 
interpretated as murder in the second degree. 
In fit a fl' v. Ru~~~'l. Supreme Court of Utah, 106 Ut. 116, 
145 P. 2d 1003, Ju~tire "'"ade stated in part, at page 1007 
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of the Pacific Reporter as follows: 
"Section 103-28-1, U. C. A. 1943, defines murder as 
the lawful killing of a human being with malice afore-
thcught. This is simply a codification of the common-law 
definition of murder. The legislature did not thereby at-
tempt to define, in its rown language, what constituted 
murder at common law, but merely adopted the common-law 
definition of murder, which means that we have ,also adopted 
the interpretation placed thereon at common law. It is that 
in 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 194, in his definition, quot-
ed from Sir Edward Coke, he uses not only the terms used 
by our statute but other terms which express our funda-
mental concept of the necessary elements of crime. He also 
adds that malice may be expressed or implied. This statu-
tory definition is now the accepted definition or descrip-
tion of murder in practically all of the states. 1 Warren 
on Homicide, Sec. 63 and 64; 1 Wlharton's Criminal Law, 
12th Ed., 625, Sec. 419; 2 Brill's Cyclopedia 1o;f Oriminal 
Law, 1025, Sec. 614; State v. Lowe, 93 Mo. 547. 5 S. W. 
j89; People v. Davis, 8 Utah 412, 32 P. 670; People v. Halli-
day, 5 Utah 467, 17 P. 118. It was obviously the legislative 
Jntent to merely adopt the common-law definition of mur-
der together with the construction placed thereon by the 
courts as 103-28-3, U. C. A. 1943, divide murder into two 
degrees and after stating what eunstitutes murder in the 
first degree it provides that "any other homicide committed 
under such circumstances as would have constituted murd-
er at common law is murder in the second degree." 
Thus under the definition of the crime of murder as 
defined by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, if the 
Defendant James W. Rodgers in this case, was charged 
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with any crime, he was charged with the crime of second 
degre·e murder in the complaint and that he was likewise 
bound over to the District Court to stand trial for the of-
fense of second degree murder and that his objections to 
being tried for first degree murder were timely and should 
have been granted and that the court in overruling his re-
peated protests acted arbitrarily and without regard to 
the constitutional and statutory rights of the Defendant 
and contrary thereto. 
POINT II 
Pertinent provisions of the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure applicable to Point II are set forth below: 
77-23-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
"TIME TO MOVE TO QUASH OR PLEAD. - Upon 
being arraigned the defendant shall immediately, unless 
the court grants him further time, either move to quash 
the information or indictment, or plead thereto, or do both. 
If he moves to quash, without also pleading, and the motion 
is withdrawn or overruled he shall immediately plead." 
77-23-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
"MOTION TO QUASH - GROUNDS. - A motion to 
quash the information or indictment shall be available only 
on one or more of the follmving grounds. In the case of: 
(1) Either an information or indictment: 
(a) That it does not charge the defendant with the 
commission of an offense. 
(f) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction 
of offense charged or of the person of the defendant. 
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(2) An information: 
(a) That an information was filed wi,thout the defend-
ant first having had or waived a preliminary examination. 
(c) That the prosecuting attorney had no authority 
to file the information. 
If a motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in 
the information or indictment which can be cured by 
amendment the court shall order the amendment to be 
made and shall overrule the motion." 
Article 1, Section 13, Constitution of Utah. 
(Prosecuting by information or indictment in grand 
jury.) 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by in-
dictment, shall be prosecuted by information after exam-
ination and committment by a magistrate, unless the ex-
amination be waived by the accused with the consent of 
the State, or by indictment, with or without such examin-
ation and committment. The grand jury shall consist of 
seven persons, five of whom must concur and find an in-
dictment; but no grand jury shall be dmwn or summoned 
unless in the opinion of the judge of the district public 
interest demands it. 
State v. Jensen, Supreme Court of Utah, 136 P. 2d 
949. The court said on page 951 of the Pacific Reporter as 
follows: 
"Was the defendant given a preliminary hearing for 
the offense of which she was convicted? If she was not 
the cause must be reversed, regardless of the other 
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claimed errors in the trial. That defendant cannot law-
fully be tried and convicted on a charge upon which 
she was not given or on which she did 
not waive a preliminary hearing is elemental. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. 1, Sec. 13; Section 105-1-4 
R. S. U. 1933; being Section 105-1-4 U. C. A. 1943; 
State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P. 2d 1034; State 
v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 39 P. 2d 1091; State v. Spencer, 
15 Utah 149, 49 P. 302." 
Quoting from page 955 : 
"Since defendant was convicted of uttering a forged 
instrument, and there was no such charge in the com-
plaint, it follows defendant was not given a prelimin-
ary hearing for the offense of which she was convicted. 
The cause is reversed and remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent herewith." 
In State v. Pay, Supreme Court of Utah, 146 P. 300, the 
defendant was charged with larceny in the complaint and 
charged in the information with marking sheep with intent 
to 'Steal. 
"(3) It should here also be stated that, in all that 
this court has said upon the right of a preliminary 
examination and respecting the right to waiYe, it 
shnws that the right has been regarded as a substan-
tial one, and that it had reference to the charge pre-
ferred against the accused in the complaint. See State 
v. Jensen, 3·1 Utah, 166, 96 Pac. 1085; State v. Hoben, 
36 Utah, 186, 102 Pac. 1000." 
Points numbered III, IV, and V insofar as they relate to 
the sufficiency of the pleadings and constitutional rights 
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and guarantees ·of defendant have been heretofore pre-
s·ented in the above arguments relating to points 1 and 2. 
POINT NO. VI 
Point six resolves itself to the question of the sanity 
or insanity of the defendant. It is contended that the de-
fendant is insane due to the organic disease of syphilis 
which has centralized in the central nervous system and 
whioh, has robbed him of his ability to control his im-
pulses or actions. 
The defendant relied on the defense of insanity and 
on this part see page 5, lines 4 through 24 of the transcript: 
"MR. REYNOLDS: Your Honor, there are two prelim-
inary matters that I think should be called to your atten-
tion. The statute requires that at least four days prior to 
the commencement of the trial a written notice be served 
on the District Atorney informing him of the Defendant's 
intention to take advantage of the plea of insanity and 
raise that question and make it an issue in the trial. The 
notice was given to Mr. Bunnell by phone that we intended 
to do that, and I understood that I could file the written 
notice later, and I think that it can be stipulated can't it, 
Mr. Bunnell? 
:MR. BUNNELL: W-e have no objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: There can't possibly be any claim of sur-
prise, because at the very beginning of this case it was 
announced that would be the defense, so the record may 
show that, if you have now filed written notice - Have 
you filed it? 
MR. REYNOLDS: Yes, it has been filed, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: That the State waives any claim rela-
tive to the time of its filing." 
The following are pertinent provisions of the Utah 
Criminal Code, to wit: 
76-1-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
"Who are capable of committing crime. - All persons 
are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging 
to the following classes: 
(1) Children under the age of seven years. 
(2) Children between the ages of seven years and 
fourteen years, in the absence of clear proof that at the 
time of committfing the ~act charged against them they 
knew its wrongfulness. 
( 4) Lunatics and insane persons. 
(6) Persons who commit the act charged without 
being conscious thereof. 
77-48-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
"Insane persons not to be punished for crime. - No 
person while insane shall be tried, adjudged to punishment 
or punished for a public offense." 
The Utah Supreme Court is committed to the prop-
sition that the defendant in criminal cases is insane and 
shall not be tried, adjudged to punishment or punished for 
a public offense when the accused: 
1. Did not linow the nature of his act. 
2. Did not know it was wrong in the sense that such 
an act wa~ condemned by morals or law; or~ 
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3.Was unable by reason of his mental disease to con-
trol his actions or impulses to injure or kill. 
Speaking for the Court in State v. Green, Supreme 
Court of Utah, 78 Ut. 580, 6 P. 2d 177, at pages 184 and 
185 of the Pacific 'Reporter, Justice Hansen says: 
"Insanity may be a complete defense to a criminal 
act, it may reduce the degree of the offense where the 
crime is divided into degrees and where a particular 
intent is a necessary element of the greater degree, 
and it~ may neither excuse nor mitigate the offense. 
Insanity is effective in warding off or reducing pun-
ishment for crime only when it renders the person so 
afflicted irresponsible or partly irresponsible. Assum-
ing that the jury in this case found from the evidenc·e 
beyond a rea:sonable doubt that the defendant shot and 
killed James Green as charged in the information, he 
would be entitled to an acquittal if at that time he was, 
as a matter of fact, insane to such an extent that he 
either (1) did not know the nature of !his act, that is, 
did not know that he had a revolver, that it may be 
loaded, and that, if discharged at or towards James 
Green, it would probably injure or kill him; or (2) that 
when he fired the shot he did not know it was wrong 
in the sense that such act was condemned by morals 
or law; or (3) that he was unable by reason of his men-
tal disease to control his actions or impulses to injure 
or kni James Green. If the defendant was afflicted with 
a disease of the mind at the time of the alleged of-
fense in any one or more of the three manners and to 
the extent indicated, then and in such case he was not 
legally responsible. In some jurisdictions a plea of in-
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sanity, to be available, must be established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, but such is not the law in 
this state. In this jurisdiction evidence which raises 
a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the 
sanity of the accused at the time of the alleged of-
fense entitles him to an acquittal." 
"This oourt has not directly passed on the question 
as to whether or not a person is legally responsible 
where he knows the nature and quality of his act and 
also knows that the act complained of is wrong, but 
because of a diseased mind is unable to control his 
conduct. That question was apparently not presented, 
or, if presented, was not discussed, in the case of 
State v. Brown, supra, and moreover Brown was 
found, as a matter of law, to be insane. The doctrine 
of irresistible impulse was referred to in the case of 
State v. Mew1hinney_ supra, but was not determined. 
In that case it was held the evidence was insufficient 
to raise the question of insanity .It is the general, if 
not the uniform, opinion of those who have made a 
careful and scientific study of mental diseases, that 
some forms of insanity are characterized by inability 
of the person afflicted to choose the right and avoid 
doing the wrong. In the light of such generally ac-
cepted views coming from those who are best quali-
fied to speak on the subject, we are of the opinion that 
courts are not justified in holding that, as a matter of 
law, uo such form of insanity exists. or that such in-
sanity does not render the person so afflicted legally 
irresponsible. One who knows the right but because of 
mental disease his will is so deranged or disordered 
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that it fails to function and cannot direct or control 
the acts of the person so afflicted is and should be 
recognized as being legally insane. Volitional ability 
to choose the right and avoid the wrong is as funda-
mental in the required guilty intent of one accused 
of crime as is the intellectual power to discern right 
from wrong and understand the nature and quality of 
his acts. In reaching this conclusion, we are not un-
mindful that many courts have reached a different 
conclusion." 
"The only irresistible impulse recognized as a com-
plete defense to a crime is one arising solely from a 
mental disease." 
It is submitted to this Court that the medical testi-
mony concerning defendant's defense of insanity and the 
state's rebuttal which appears in the transcript of the test-
imony at pages 219 through 280, is uncontradicted and 
establishes beyond all reasonable question of a doubt that 
the defendant is suffering from syphilis which has central-
ized inthe central nervous system and which had affected 
hie mind at the time of the fatal incident to the extent 
that he was so deranged and disordered that h·e could not 
control his acts. The jury, for reasons best known to them, 
have disregarded the undisputed and established facts and 
the instructions of the Court on the question of insanity. 
While it is conceeded that the appellate court wiJI 
not ordinarily interfere with a verdict of the jury, it is 
submitted that it is proper for it to do so where th·e ver-
dict is clearly and papably against the weight of the evi-
dence. It is further submitted that in this case there is a 
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total lack of proof to sustain the verdict. 
We quote from 5 C. J. S. page 638-639 and 655, which 
sets forth the general principle applicable as follows: 
"It is well settled that the verdict will be set aside 
when it is clearly and papably against the great weight 
of the evidence, where there is a total lack of proof 
to sustain the verdict, where the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the verdict, where there is a 
strong preponderence of evidence over that on which 
the verdict is based, and it appears that injustice has 
been done or where manifest injustice thereof shows 
mistake, prejudice, sympathy, corruption, or other 
improper motive on the part of the jury, or where the 
verdict is so contrary to the weight of the evidence as 
to shock the ordinary fair minded person." 
In support of defendant Rodgers' argument that the 
jury rendered a verdict contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence with respect to the question of the sanity 
of the defendant, we assume that the Court will examine 
all of the medical testimony in detail. However, for the 
purpose of emphasizing such testimony, we take the liberty 
of quoting extensively from the testimony of the witnesses 
with respect to the .question of the sanity of the Defendant. 
Dr. Chester B. Powell, an l\1. D. specializing in the 
field o,f neurology and neurosurgery, testified on behalf of 
the Defendant to the effect that the Defendant had syphilis 
of tfte central nervous system, that is, the brain and spinal 
cord. The significant portions of the testimony of Dr. Pow· 
ell are set forth below. beginning at page 220 et seq 
of the transcript of the trial: 
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"Q. Now, Doctor, do you know the Defenrant, James 
Rogers? 
A. Yes I had occasion to examine him on December 
3, 1957. 
Q. Now, Doctor, what did this examination include? 
A. I took a history from the patient. Including any 
symptoms he might have. I discussed his background with 
respect to diseases, illnesses. The family from which he 
came. I tf.en examined him with particular reference to the 
nervous ::ystem. Which is a rather detailed examination 
including bhe test of the eyes and of the various nerves that 
come off the brain. The extension movement, patient co-
ordination. Reflexes when we tap with the hammer. I 
checked his sensation in various forms like touch, pain, 
vibraUon, so :forth. And had him walk. Examined his pos-
ture and gait. Sense of balance. Looked for special signs. 
And then finally did a brain wave test on him. 
Q. Now, Doctor, in your practice have you had exper-
ience with persons who have had syphHis of the nervous 
system? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now in connection with your examination of this 
Defendant and assuming the fact, Dr. Powell, that there 
had been two positive serologies of the sprinal fluid of this 
Defendant, do you have an opinion of what that indicates? 
A. Yes, the indicatlion is syphilitic infection. 
Q. Now, Doctor, assuming also the fact that there 
have been two serologies of the Defendant's blood which 
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were negative, what would that indicate to you in relation-
ship to the positive spinal serology? 
A. Well in most cases where there is a syphilitic in-
fection somewhere in the body the blood test is positive in 
some degree. It often is positive in the spinal fluid. Now if 
there is an infection in the nervous system itself, that is to 
say, the brain or the spinal cord, then in most instances 
the spinal fluid also shows a positive serology. However, 
this isn't a hundred percent the case. In about ninety five 
to ninety-seven percent of patients infected with syphilis 
in the nervous sy·stem the spinal fluid serology is positive. 
And in some .three to five percent of the cases it may be 
negative. The blood likewise is not a hundred percent pos-
itive when, particularly when the syphilitic infection is in 
the nervous sy·stem. About three percent on the average 
o1 patients with syphilis of the nervous system will show 
a negative blood serology. 
If neither blood or spinal fluid serology is positive, 
then the diagnosis of syphilis can be made, but it has to 
be made on other grounds. And it is a rather difficult and 
suspecting diagnosis in that instance. But if one or the otlher 
serology, blood or spinal fliud, is positive then the, that 
alone presents the presumptive diagnosis of syphilis. 
Q. With respect to this Defendant, Mr. Rodgers, is the 
diagno'Sis a strong or weak diagnosis? 
A. The diagnosis of syphilis in this instance depends 
on the sp·inal fluid serology. I have considered that in his 
case since we have a question posed by the fact that his 
blood serology is negative. And also by the fact that he 
doesn't have any prominent clinical signs of syphilis. In 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
other words, when we examined lhim we don't find .the 
usual changes in the reflexes and the coordination and so 
forth that we might expect to find in some degree. So I 
was particularly concerned about the diagnosis. 
Now there are other possibilities of known, known to 
occur which are quite rare, and which other factors can pro-
duce a positive syphilitic reaction. It is called a false posi-
tive. In other words, you get the reaction but it doesn't 
mean what it says. 
Q. Well now may I interrupt, Doctor. Are tlhose oc-
ca·sions of rfalse positive common? 
A. No, they are exceedingly rare. And they may occur 
under certain circumstances such as the following: In this 
country most often we see it happen when a patient has a 
brain tumor which causes a secretion of protein into tlhe 
spinal fluid, and in very rare instances when the protein 
is quite high this may produce a false positive. 
In the tropics there are certain tropical diseases which 
are infrequent and do not occur in this climate which can 
also produce a false positive reaction. 
There is also an acute infection of the lymph glands 
of the body and tlh'is disease occurs in this country, which 
has been reported on rare instances to cause a false pos-
itive. 
Now because of the lack of a positive blood serology 
I wondered in this instance in this patient whether the posi-
tive serology in the spinal fluid could be so-called false pos~­
tive. So I considered his findings, and he does not have, nei-
ther by examination or by the brain wave, any evidence of 
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brain tumor. And, furthermore, his spinal fluid protein is 
normal. Secondly, he has no signs of this lymph gland 
disease. Thirdly, he has no signs, and there is no basis 
for making any diagnosis of a tropical disease. So there is 
no evidence whatever to suspect tihat the positive ·serology 
is a so-called false positive. The only conclusion that I can 
come to then is that this reaction which is a standard diag-
nostic test, highly reliable, used tlhroughout the world, 
means that this man has an infection with syphilis and 
specifically in the nervous system. 
Q. Now, Doctor, when you say in the nervous sy·stem, 
does tfue fact that it is taken from spinal fluid have any 
particular significance? 
A. In what respect? 
Q. Well, what are the vital organs of the nervous sys-
tem? 
A. We divide the nervous system in two major parts. 
The central nervous system which is the brain and spinal 
cord, and the nerves constitute the otber part. The nerves 
in the arms and legs. Throughout the body. The spinal 
fluid is associated with the central nervous system. Pro-
duced in the brain, circulates through the brain, around 
the brain and down the spinal canal. So when we encounter 
an infection of the nervous system such as syphilis the evi-
dence of that infection is found in tlhe spinal fluid. 
Q. Now when one has syphilis of the brain and the 
spinal cord, what is the effect on the brain and spinal cord? 
A. This i~ a loaded question. 
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Q. Perhaps I shouldn't have asked it, but try please. 
A. Almost any, any symptoms having to do with the 
nervous system and almost any signs we see in the way of 
weakness or change of sensation, change of reflexes, in 
coordination, mental changes, paralysis, almost any change 
that reflects s•omebhing wrong in the nervous system can 
be caused by syphilis. It has been called the great imitator 
because it can simulate so many other diseases. So the med-
ical profession from time immemorial has been alerted to 
suspect this condition and keep a watchful eye for it be-
cause it may appear in so many guises. 
Q. Now - Pardon me 
A. Let me-
Q. Go right aihead. 
A. Let me go a little further. I can just enumerate 
briefly some of the varities of disordor that syphilis in the 
nervous system causes. In the acute infection it causes an 
acute inflamation of the brain and spinal cord. And the 
covering. It may, in fact, produce a meningitis like spinal 
meningitis. Later on it produces scarring in the tissue. 
And tlhis scar may affect predominantly the brain or pre-
dominantly the spinal cord, or predominantly the blood ves-
sels in the brain, and depending on which area is involved 
the symptoms will vary. If it involves the brain it will af-
fect the functions of the brain. And it will produce symp-
toms like a headadhe. Loss of memory. Any mental symp-
toms. Impairing of thinking, vision. Impairment of vision 
or hearing. Impairment of speech, and produces mental 
changes and very comm·only does as it progresses. In the 
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spinal cord it produces usually weakness in the extremeties 
and loss of coordination. With impairrnent of gait, loss of 
balance. When it affects the blood vessels of tlhe nervous 
system it usually produces some indication of both brain 
and spinal cord symptoms. Any of these infections, any of 
these localizations of the infection will produce usually 
a positive serology both in the blood and the spinal fluid. 
Q. With respect to the mental changes which this di-
sease causes, would you explain to the Court and Jury please 
what some of those are? 
A. In the same way that syphilis can simulate other 
organic diseases like brain tumor and injury, it can also 
simulate mental disease itself. In other words, mental 
changes tJhat are associated with syphilitic infection of the 
brain can duplicate other types of mental disease. But most 
often it produces changes in the realm of thinking. "\Vhich 
result in what we call delusions. 
Delusions are false beliefs. The person is deluded. He 
may believe he is the President of the United States. Or 
God. That is a false belief. But in his mind that is the truth 
so far as he is concerned. The delusions that are character-
istic of syPhilitic infection of the nervous system take on 
a variety of patterns. Usually they are ideas of grandeur, 
in which a person will feel that he is important, that he 
has great powers. He will identify himself as the President, 
as a general, for instance. And \·ery often lbe is either God 
or Jesus or someone else of great religious significance. 
The other type of delusion apart from grandeur and 
expansiveness includes things like feeling that they have 
grPat wealth. Feeling that they can control people's actions. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
51 
And then anotJher large set of delusions are what the doc-
tors call ideas of reference in which the patient refers 
ev,erything to himself. In terms of himself. If he sees a 
policeman coming down the street lhe is apt to think, well 
I better get out of here because this policeman is obviously 
after me. In other words, he doesn't have the normal reac-
tion, well there goes John or there goes a cop. But he refer-
ences the policeman and the situation to him.self. These 
ideas of reference may take a pattern of fear, or they may 
take the pattern, and this is a very common group called 
paranoid. In which these ideas of reference in the patient's 
mind imply a threat. These, many such patients are the 
ones you read about in the papers who suddenly kill some-
one else and afterward they say, well I was threatened. 
These are the dangerous lunatics. They are the ones if we 
can recognize them beforehand are the ones that are com-
mitted to the State Hospital and often have to be put into 
confinement because they are the individuals who feel that 
Russia, the Russians are after them or their wife or their 
husband is after them, that all the policemen are after tihem. 
All the ideas of reference apply to themselves and imply a 
threat and they are very unhappy people because they are 
so terribly endangered. And tlhese are the ones that because 
of this danger that their delusions tell them they are threat-
ened with, they have to protect themselves and this often 
means fighting or committing some violent act to ward 
off the threat." 
Q. I see. Of course, Doctor, even if we as,sume that he 
has syphilis of the, at least that the test showed a positive 
in his spinal fluid, we don't know that the central nervous 
system or brain has been affected at all do we? 
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A. The implication of the positive serology in the 
spinal fluid is assuming that it is not a false positive? 
Q. Yes. 
A. There is infection in the nervous system. Syphilitic 
infection of the nervous system, and I think that with that, 
that that implication is unaltered by the fact that there 
were no clinical signs or brain wave changes." 
"Q. Doctor, are these psychiatric examinations and 
psychological examinations a part of the, tlhe examinations 
normally employed in diagnosis of syphilis of the brain? 
A. Would you restate your question? 
(Question read by reporter.) 
A. Yes. Psychological tests are very important be-
cause very often the psychologic tests provide the basis 
for the clinical diagnosis of central nervous system in-
volvement." 
Dr. John Landward appeared on behalf of the Defend-
ant to testify as a clinical psychologist. An exmaination of 
the transcript will demonstrate the qualifications of Dr. 
Landward. Dr. Landward's testimony is most significant 
because of the fact that his examination shows to have 
been conducted without reference to any history of the 
beha \'im· of the defendant and designed primarily to ac-
complish an analysis of the mental condition of the De· 
fendant by use of objective tests. The testimony of Dr. 
Landward eloquently demonstrated the discovery of organic 
mental disorder and we quote extensively from the testi· 
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mony of Dr. Landward as follows, beginning at page 2312 
et seq of the transcript, to wit: 
"Q. Now how would you define or classify mental 
disorder? 
A. Well there are two general broad classifications. 
One you call the organic and having to do with the, primar-
ily the physical aspect and the functional that has prima·r-
ily to do with the emotional and personal aspect. 
Q. Would you define the organic type? 
A. The organic has to do primarily with the, what we 
call the neurological or the nervous system and this has to 
do with various kinds of damage to the nervous system. 
Particularly the central neTvous system and damage being 
caused by various agents such as disease, encephalitis, 
syphilis, poison, physical damage, and so on. Is that what 
you had in mind? 
Q. Yes, thank you. On the other hand, how would you 
define the functional type disorder? 
A. The functional type primarily has to do with the 
influences of the environment upon the person, and how 
this molds the person into the kind of person he is. His 
basic attitude. His viewpoint or what you might call his 
life style. Style of life. 
Q. Is there any relationship between the functional 
type mental disorder and the organic type meu.t.al disorder? 
A. Yes. You can't separate the phy,sical ,from the per-
son because they are inter-related. We have to use them 
both. And very frequently damage to the physical affects 
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the personal attributes and expressions and manifestations 
of the person. And likewise in reverse." 
Q. Now in your examination of the subject What pro-
cedures do you use to determine if there are any indications 
of an organic disorder? 
MlR. BUNNELL: Your Honor, I think that I will ob-
ject to this unless we can tie it in with this case some way. 
The general procedures he uses in organic disorders, can't 
we tie it down to this Defendant and get on with it? 
THE COURT: Well I don't know myself. He is laying 
a foundation for some other judgement, so he may proceed. 
I can't tell as yet. 
A. Well the, my, as I would see it my primary involve-
ment in the situation was to give the Defendant some psy-
chological tests. Which is one of the primary functions of 
tfue clinical psychologists and psychiatrists determination, 
and the tests that I used in regard to the Defendant are the 
following: What we call the Wexler Adult Intelligence 
Scale. Rorscach Ink Blot Test. The Bender-Gesthalt Motor 
Test. The Schematic Apperception Test, and a Sentence 
Completion Test. Now the way that you asked the question 
I think I should charify this. That I, when I tested the De-
fendant I had no notion that this man might have some 
organic involvement. I was merely giving him a battery of 
tests to evaluate him as a person, his viewpoint, attitude, 
function, intellectual function and so on. 
Q. Pardon me, Doctor, on what day was that examina-
tion conducted by you? 
A. November 23, 1957. 
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Q. Now with respect to each of the examinations that 
you gave the Defendant would you explain the nature of the 
examination and the result if you will please? 
A. Well I usually give these tests in a certain sequence. 
I am accustomed to it. The very first test that I gave to 
the Defendant was this Bender-Gesthalt Motor Test. This 
is composed of some cards, eight cards on which there are 
some rather simple figures. And the test is for the person 
who takes the test to copy these figures. I present them to 
him one at a time, and the instructions are, "You copy this 
on a blank sheet of paper the best way that you can." Those 
are all the instructions that I give to the person who takes 
the test. 
And as he finishes one ,figure, copying or drawing the 
figure as he sees it on the card I present, I withdraw that 
card and present the next one. So on through the sequence 
of these cards. Now it is generally well known that indi-
viduals who suffer some damage, physical neurological dam-
age, this shows up in their physical coordination and so on. 
And though this may appear to be a rather simple thing, 
what we call eye-hand coordination, we learn this as we grow 
up so we just take these things for granted; but when some 
of the nerves are damaged then this comes up, and we notice 
people not being able to reproduce these particular figures 
accurately. And there are two or three of these particular 
figures which we know from studies that have been made, 
psychological experiments that have been made with the 
brain damaged people, particularly what we call a figure 
grr und kind of operation, intellectual operation which in-
volves expression of this, or through the use of the muscles 
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tha1 in, people these processes of clearly seeing the figure 
and ground, and I don't know how to express this, but when 
he nets used to say this scenic country out here and you 
get to seeing things you get accustomed to seeing things 
in certain locations. And if something happens to you they 
look kind of odd to you and funny to you and this is just 
on tre area of perception, but when you attempt to repro-
?uce the things with muscles this is difficult, and partic-
ularly this one figure in my experience with these kind of 
people they have difficulty in what we call the overlapping 
figures on that one card. And in the Defendant's case, as I 
say, I ha \l no notion of what, as far as I was concerned this 
was goint' to be an evalution of him as a person, and I give 
this test routinely. Pick up any clues that I might look for 
in the rest of the battery of the tests that I give to these in-
dividuals. And I noticed that on this particular card that 
this man had a good bit of difficulty of reproducing these 
overlapping figures. I asked him to try it again. He did so 
and went through the exact process. He acknowledged his 
difficulty. I don't recall exactly what he said, but some dif-
ficulty he recognized of drawing this thing the way it was 
done by people who don't have this kind of difficulty. 
Q. Wlhat did you conclude from that inability? 
A. I concluded then on some of the other tests that I 
gave that I would then examine this particular, what I per-
ceived as an impairment or disfunction, and see if I would 
be able to discern this as I went along through the other 
tests of, that also are sensitive to brain damage. Should I 
go on and tell what these are? 
Q. Let me ask you thi~ question first. Did you make any 
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recommendation with respect to this impairment? 
A. You mean at the conclusion of my examination? Yes. 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes I did. I suggested tlhat this man be examined 
further by other clinical procedures. Particularly proced-
ures that are used by neurologists. I didn't specify, I left 
that up to the person that you might refer the Defendant 
to. Ordinarily I think, I think when I talked to you, I think 
I at least mentioned that he get an E. E. G. 
Q. Now what did then your examination include other 
than that matter you told us about? 
A. It included these other tests that I mentioned that 
I used in the battery. The Wexler Bellview Adult Intelli-
gence Scale is a test that is widely used throughout the 
country in hospitals and clinics for evaluation of intellec-
tual performance. There are two or three of these what we 
call sub-tests. And are tests that are used to detect any 
brain damage impairment. One of these is what we call the 
block design test. This is made up of nine little blocks that 
are colored white and red and they have a white side, a 
red side and half of them, some of them have a half red 
and white. A person who takes this particular test, we have 
some designs which we present to them and ask them then 
to take these blocks and to put these 'blocks together so 
that they come out with the design matching the one on 
the card that we give them. Now to the extent that they 
find difficulty in doing this, of course, we have tb inquire 
as to what their problem was, how they perceived this. If 
they seem to be puzzled or did it wrong, then of course we 
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have to inquire and find out what the particular problem is. 
And again, in people who have brain damage they have a 
feeling or idea that they know how to do it but just can't 
quite fit it together, and this again is what we call a sort of 
impetence. This is one of the technical terms that we use, 
but it is used in the sense that a person has a sense of know-
ing what needs to be done, but not being able to do it. And 
Mr. Rodgers on this particular test had difficulty on again 
one of tlhese designs that is particularly sensitive to people 
who have brain damage. Now this was my second corrob-
orative bit of evidence that I picked up from the previous 
test. 
Q. Then what did you do next in your examination? 
A. Then I go to the ink blot test whic'h consists of ten 
cards on which there are some designs again. I have these 
thing with me if you want me to show the people. 
Q. You might demonstrate this one, Doctor. 
A. These are the ten blocks. They are just made from 
ink blot designs. The man who worked with this technique 
was a man by the name of Rorscach. He was a Swiss psy-
chiatrist and that is why it is called Rorscach, after Dr. 
Rorscach. And he used these to have people look at and 
then tell him what he thought they saw in them or imag-
ined they could look like or resemble and so on. And this 
is again one of the standard techniques that we use to ex-
amine people, mentally disturbed, emotionally disturbed 
people. And from it we get some pretty clear ideas. Sort 
of a quick cross section of how they react to stimulus and 
environment, social, psychological situations. 
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Q. Now with respect to the Defendant-
A. And in this - I was coming to that. Again in this 
test a person with brain damage shows up particular diffi-
culty. Again it is the same kind of difficulty that you pick 
up in the block design test. The difficulty in pulling togeth-
er in the Whole sense, what we call an integrated sense, a 
particular image that appears to him that he formulates in 
his mind and tell me what he sees there. This is particularly 
true in people of w'hat I call good intelligence. 
Now I haven't mentioned this, and you haven't asked 
me for it, but I will state it here. Mr. Hodger'3 is a person 
with what we vwuld, a person with intelligence. In the 
I. Q. tests he had an average I. Q. test of 122 Which places 
him in what we call the superior intelectual group. On some 
of the sub tests that I, have to do with abstract reason, he 
was wlhat we call a very superior level of intelligence, com-
ing out with an I. Q. of 132. So these kind of people who 
have this level of intelligence, coming out with rather sim-
ple concrete kinds of ideas, together with the other evidence 
that I had accumulated in the other two tests, in my exper-
ience this again is another evidence to me that tlhis man is 
not living up to or expressing his potentialities, and the 
number of cases that I have seen usually have been sub-
stantiated as having some kind of brain disfunction or 
brain damage. 
Q. Was that indicated by t1he result of Mr. Rodgers test 
on this Rorscach Test? 
A. Yes. Perhaps I didn't make that clear. But again I 
· used this as an, another bit of evidence from the total bat-
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tery of tests that this is What this should be interpreted 
in my experience. 
Q. Now, Doctor, what is the relationship between intel-
ligence and high I. Q. and mental disorders? 
A. Well, quite a relationship. We know that people with 
high I. Q.'s usually come out with certain kinds of mental 
disorders rather than others. For example, people with 
high I. Q.'s when they get, if there are mental disturbances 
and so on are likely to come out with, oh, what we could call 
paranoid stages, paranoid conditions. And so on. That is, 
if they are disturbed. There are groups of mental conditions, 
but this is one that frequently you see with people with high 
I. Q.'s. 
Q. Doctor, now with reference to your examination of 
the Defendant, Mr. Rodgers, do you have an opinion of his 
mental condition? 
A. You mean now? 
Q. Yes. 
A. You mean as a result of my examination? Yes. 
Q. Yes 
A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. What is the opinion, your opinion? 
A. My opinion is that Mr. Rodgers is an emotionally, 
mentally, intellectually, disturbed person. I see him as a per-
son who, because of the environment, environmental situ-
ation and the stress of ~is particular environment grew up 
with I think, as I would see it, a distorted viewpoint about 
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people and about life situations that involved people. And 
the distorted viewpoint as I would see it comes out gener-
ally as being a rather distrustful person. A suspicious per-
son, one I think Who would tend generally to misunderstand 
and misinterpret the intentions and motives of people in 
regard to himself as a person. He would be easily threat-
ened by individuals because of his, of his, of his very sens-
itive nature in regard to how people treat him. And I think, 
it would be my conclusion from tihe test materials and test 
data would, would lead me certainly to the opinion that it 
would be difficult for him, certainly under stress, to accur-
ately evaluate the nature of things going on about him. 
Particularly when these are threatening to him and the 
picture of himself that he has to maintain to feel adequate 
as a person. 
Q. Doctor, in your opinion does the Defendant suffer 
from delusions.? 
A. I think he could under stress. Well I would say de-
lusions in the sense as I understand them, that under stress 
he would not accurately perceive the nature of the situa-
tion as it affected him in the way that he would feel that 
he would have to maintain hims·elf and his integrity with 
himself. I think because of his sensitivity in relationship 
to people that he would more likely perceive things inac-
curately under stressful situations and the meaning of that 
situation than the ordinary person would. 
Q. How would you define the mental condition of the 
Defendant? 
A. You mean the label that we, I would give to it? 
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Q. Yes. 
A. I defined it in my report as primarily egoid char-
acter disorder with strong paranoid tendencies. Do you 
want me to tell you what I think that means? 
Q. I'm afraid I will have to ask you what tlhat means 
now. 
A. All right. To me egoid character disorder is a person 
who has rather detached relationships with people. There 
is a certain amount of aloofness, a certain amount of dist-
ance that they place between people. They may be friendly, 
but you never feel that you get hold of these people as a per-
son. They live around people, but they are not with people. 
They are not part of the community or the social life. And 
this is what I have in mind, sort of a detached, isolated kind 
of person. 
Now the paranoid condition as I understand that can 
best be explained as I understad it as a certain suspicious-
ness about t'he intentions and motives of people toward 
them. Feeling in a sense that there is always, particularly 
if you are challenged, that you have got to prove yourself. 
And so on. Sometimes it comes out in grandiose ways. They 
may say things, boast about things that tlhey have done 
that they may not have done and begin to believe perhaps 
that they have done in order to build up this picture of 
themselves that is important to them because of their very 
strong feeling of being inadequate as a person.'' 
"Q. Assuming then, Dr. Landward, that the Defendant 
has had a positive serology on two spinal tests, one a two 
plus and one a three plus, would that affect in any way 
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your opinion as to his mental condition? 
A. Well I would assume that some disease process cer-
tainly is involved. 
Q. Would this have any relation? 
A. To the extent that this is one of the, classified under 
brain syndromes classifications of mental disturbances and 
mental disorders. T·hen I would have to accept that as indi-
cating some degree of brain damage. And this certainly 
would make me feel that the things that I picked up on my 
psychological tests could be explained in this way. If there 
weren't any other history of some other brain damage by 
blows on the head or excessive alcohol or a number of other 
things that can bring about brain damage. 
Q. Did your examination disclose any cause of brain 
damage? 
A. No, it can't do that. It is not designed to do that. It 
is merely designed to detect brain damage in t1he intellec-
tual and muscular cyclomotor functions of the individual. 
Q. Now, Doctor, I have a hypothetical question to pose 
to you. It is rather lengthy. Doctor, please assume these 
to be a fact. That this man Rodgers that you 11ave examined 
was working at the Rattle Snake Mine in San Juan County 
for a period of about eight months up and to June 19, 1957; 
that on one occasion during that period he struck a co-
worker named Dee Gardner several times over an alterca-
tion concerning the loading of a truck. In addition to t1~1:1t 
he had an altercation with another man named Bobby 
Goodnight which was a disagreement arising over the 
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dumping of some ore. That Rodgers apologized to this fellow 
Goodnight. Goodnight accepted his apology with the re-
mark as follows, "I accept your apology but I will never 
forget it." That the Defendant Rodgers bragged and exag-
gerated before his fellow workers, and he was therefore 
teased and ribbed, perhaps no worse than others on the job 
were teased and ribbed. That approximately nineteen days, 
that is around June 1st of 1957, Mr. Rodgers had an alter-
cation with tlhe Deceased, Mr. Merrifield, and that at that 
time Mr. Merrifield accused Mr. Rodgers of not performing 
some of his tluties. And in the ensuing agrument that the 
Deceased, Mr. Merrifield, called Mr. Rodgers a damned liar. 
And that on the 18th of June of this year the Defendant 
related a story to one Tommy Thompson to the effect that 
he, Rodgers, had heard that Merrifield was going to pick a 
beef with Rodgers and that Rodgers stated that if so he 
would be ready for Merrifield. And then assume that on the 
19th day of June, 1957, that the Defendant Rodgers was 
working in the mine pit with several other employees and 
that the Deceased, Charles Merrifield, remarked to two oth-
er employees, "You better get off your ass or I'll 1Jell Boss 
Rodgers." That Rodgers overheard this remark and stated 
to Dennis Ingraham, another fellow worker, that he was 
going to have to kill Merrifield. And that he was going to 
get his gun. That Rodgers left the pit and came back with 
the gun in his belt. That he 'valked over to within twenty-
five feet of where the Deceased was loading trucks with 
a power shovel. That Rodgers waited until Merrifield had 
loaded a truck, whereupon Rodgers fired a shot into the 
ground. Merrifield rose from his seat on the shovel and as 
he was getting off t'he shovel Rodgers shot Merrifield sev-
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eral times. Rodgers claims Merrifield attacked him with a 
large wrench. No wrench has been found. Upon leaving the 
pit, Rodgers stated to a co-worker, "He asked for it and 
he got it." Rodgers fled the scene and was apprehended 
peacefully in Cortez, Colorado. Now as,suming tlhose facts, 
Dr. Landward, do you have an opinion ·of the mental condi-
tion of Mr. Rodgers at the time of the shooting incident? 
A. Yes, I could give you one. 
Q. Would you please. 
A. The way I would understand the nature of Mr. 
Rodgers as a person, the way he would be sensitive about 
himself as a person in relationship to other people, the very 
strong need to maintain himself as an adequate person, 
under circumstances that would be challenging to him with 
his distorted, as I would see it, his distorted viewpoint and 
attitude about people and how they treat him, I believe 
that over a period of time he could become so vexed that 
he would have no other choice in his own mind to do w'hat 
he did to defend himself. 
Q. Do you have an opinion, Doctor Landward, concern-
ing the ability of the Defendant, Mr. Rodgers to control 
his actions and impulses on the occasion of the shooting? 
A. Well I think I have implied that. 
MR. BUNNELL: Your Honor, I will object to that 
unless he says on the occasion stated in the hypothetical 
question. 
A. Will you state that again then? 
THE COURT: The hypothetical question'? 
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A. No, no, I have that in mind, but the question in 
terms of the hypothetical question. 
Q. Do you have an opinion, Doctor, whether at the 
time of the shooting as related in the hypothetical question 
the Defendant was in such a condition as to be able to con-
trol his actions and impulses? 
A. Well like, I should say again I t'hink I implied that 
in my previous answer. And it is this, that I do not believe 
that within himself he felt that he had any other choice 
to do than what he did, and to this ex~nt I do not believe 
that he was 3ible to control what he did. Oher than to do 
what lhe determined he had to do to maintain his safety. 
Q. Now is that what you could call a delusion? 
A. To the extent that he was unable to accurately in-
terpret and perceive the nature of the threat to him which 
he apparently perceived as being threatening to him as 
a person and as a, his physical safety as well. 
Q. In light of t'he hypothetical question propounded to 
you-
A. Let me put it this way to you. Any time there is 
a misinterpretation or exaggeration of what is happening 
to us, well, again to Mr. Rodgers to make it specific. And 
I see him being unable to accurately perceive phenomena 
or social situations or circumstances that he has always 
seen as threatening to himself. Therefore, he would tend to 
exaggerate the nature of the threat. This would be very 
rea.I to him. To us, to myself, seeing this, yes you could label 
thi::; aR a delusion, but it was not reality. 
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Q. Would that be in your opinion then, Doctor, consid-
ered to be an irresistable impulse? 
A. Yes, he had no other choice." 
A. Well I tell you this,, that I started with Mr. Rodgers 
from scatch. As far as the examination was concerned I, 
all I knew was that he was on trial, but any of his back-
ground, any of his personal history was not given to me, 
and I made no inquiry regrding it while he was there. While 
I examined him. 
Q. Did you inquire of him regarding the incident on 
June 19th? 
A. He volunteered this information. I did not inquire. 
And as far as I am concerned I didn't include this in terms 
of the interpretation of my test data. My report and my 
opinion is based primarily on my test data." 
Dr. C. Craig Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant 
as a medical doctor, specializing in psychiatry. It is signi-
ficant to point out to the Court that at the time of the 
arraignment of the Defendant, Dr. Craig Nelson was 
chosen by the District Judge, F. W. Keller, as one of the 
alienists to examine into the sanity of the Defendant and 
for some reason unknown to the Defendant, Dr. Craig Nel-
son was unable to conduct the examination until he was re-
quested to do so on behalf of the Defendant by Defendant's 
Counsel herein. Dr. Craig Nelson's testimony in this matter 
clearly demonstrates that the Defendant was suffering from 
syphilis of the brain and spinal cord and that this organic 
defect coupled with a functional mental disorder caused a 
severe mental disorder in the Defendant characterized by 
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Dr. Nelson as paranoid with psychotic delusions. Dr. Nel-
son's testimony most significantly demonstrates the mental 
condition of the Defendant at the time of the fatal incident 
and, we think, stands uncontradicted. Accordingly, we quote 
from the transcript of the trial and Dr. Nelson's testimony 
is as follows: 
"MR. REYNOLDS: May we proceed? 
CRAIG NELSON, the witness on the stand at the time of 
taking recess, resumed the stand for further examination 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. REYNOLDS: 
Q. Doctor, assume the fact that the Defendant has 
had two spinal fluid tests and that the results of these show, 
the first one shows a three plus and the second one shows 
a two plus. Assuming that fact in connection with your ex-
amination of the Defendant do you have an opinion con-
cerning his mental condition? 
A. My opinion would be that ihe is suffering from cen-
tral nervous system infection of lues or syphilis. 
Q. You base that opinion on medical indications of the 
two plus and three plus separate and apart from the psych-
iatric examination? 
A. I base it on the composite of all of them together. 
My examination plus the laboratory findings. 
Q. Then I will withdraw that question. Would you ex-
plain to the Court and Jury, Doctor, what lues of the cen-
tral nervous system means? 
A. T'his means there has been an infection of the per-
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son's body by the organism that caused it. And the infec-
tion travels to the brain and the spinal cord and the, there 
has been an actual infection of ·the structures of the brain 
and spinal cord. That this then, on the basis of an organic 
basis, there has been a definite change t1hen in the tissue 
and this then affects the way a person thinks and acts and 
feels" 
Q. Now with respect to the type of mental disorder, how 
do you classify it? 
A. We are speaking still just of the luetic infection? 
This is an organic brain condition. This is an infectious 
organic brain condition, but if we take in the additional 
facts that came out of my examination then I would say 
this of, this has brought about a specific functional state, 
a paranoid state in the individual. That is, this plus all of 
the effects of his past. 
Q. Now will you explain what are the charactistics of 
this type of paranoid condition? 
A. A paranoid condition is one where there is an ab-
normal, unusually large amount of suspicion, or jealously. 
Of, there is a grandiose or bragging kind of nature to an 
individual. These are all of an abnormal and unusually large 
component. The person is inclined to be, to keep his feel-
ings to himself up to a point, but then he can contain t'hem 
no longer and there is often a discharge of these feelings, 
an action, a very impulsive action. 
Q. Now does this type of person suffer from feelings 
of persecution? 
A. Yes. This would be in the area of the suspiciousness 
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and jealousy. Where there is always a feeling that people 
pick on or plan against or do things to hurt an individual. 
To hurt them. 
Q. Did the Defendant display these feelings and atti-
tudes to you? 
A. Yes. I, in my examination I felt that he regularly 
described in relationships with several people that he came 
in contact with this feeling he was picked on or pushed 
around or ridiculed. He felt very much the same in regard 
to three people. Each time he would handle it in the same 
way. Kind of repetitious way. Where he felt, where first 
of all he would deny that 1he was jealous or that he cared, 
but then all of the feelings would suddenly come out and he 
was compelled to act with each of these three people in 
suclh a way as to provoke a fight or attempt to provoke a 
fight, or, in one instance that led to the shooting. 
Q. Doctor, is that what you call systematization? 
A. Yes, this is systematization in this, in the sense tllat 
it is repeated over and over again. The same pattern where 
he feels that someone is pushing him, out to get ihim, be-
littling him. He takes it as long as he can, doesn't let little 
bits of feeling out the way most people do, but then is com-
pelled to erupt to get this feeling out. 
Q. Is this true though in fact the reality doesn't sup-
port it, these feelings? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now did the Defendant exhibit to you any delusions? 
A. It was my opinion that the actions that he des-
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cribed in terms of eac'h of these fights and the shooting he 
was acting on a delusion that he had to either defend his 
honor, his self esteem or his personal body. 
Q. In your opinion would that be a psychotic delusion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Doctor, I am going to propound a hypotheti-
cal question to you, and I want you to assume these facts in 
connection with your diagnosis of the Defendant. Assume 
that this man Rodgers was working at the Rattle Snake 
Mine 'here in San Juan County for a period of about eight 
months up until the 19th of June, 1957. And that on one oc-
casion he had an altercation with a man by the name of 
Dee Gardner concerning the manner in which a truck should 
be loaded and that as a result of that the Defendant struck 
Dee Gardner about three times. Now assume also that on 
another occasion he had an altercation wit'h a fellow by 
the name of Bobby Goodnight and that this arose out of a 
disagreement concerning the dumping of ore. And that 
Rodgers apologized for t'his and in response Goodnight ac-
cepted his apology and said, "I will accept your apology 
but I will never forget it." Assume that Rodgers bragged 
and exaggerated before his fellow workers and that he 
therefore was teased and ribbed and perhaps to no more 
extent than the other men on the job were also teased and 
ribbed. And assume that about on June the 1st, 1957, that 
t'he Defendant had an altercation with the Deceased, Charle8 
Merrifield, and that the Deceased accused the Defendant 
of not performing his duties and an argument ensued and 
that the Deceased, Merrifield, called Rodgers a damned liar. 
And then assume on the 19th, or t'he 18th day of June 
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1957, that the Defendant related to a man by the name of 
Tommy Thompson that he, Rodgers, had heard that Merri-
field was going to pick a beef with him before Merrifield 
left the job. And that if he did Rodgers would be ready for 
him. And then further assume that on the 19th day of 
Jun·e 1957, that the Defendant was working in this mine 
pit with other employees and that Charles Merrifield re-
marked to two other employees as follows, "You better get 
off your ass or I'll tell Boss Rodgers." That Rodgers over-
heard this remark and stated to Dennis Ingrahm, another 
worker, that he was going to have to kill Merrifield before 
Merrifield left. And that he would also have to get his gun 
That Rodgers left the pit and came back with the gun in 
his belt. That he walked over to within twenty-five feet of 
where the Deceased, Mrrifield, was loading trucks with a 
power shovel. And that Rodgers waited until Merrifield 
had completed loading one of these trucks and then he shot 
into the ground. That Merrifield rose from his seat on the 
shovel and as Merrifield was getting off Rodgers shot Mer-
rifield several times. Rodgers claims Merrifield attached 
him with a large wrench. No wrench has been found. Upon 
leaving this pit after the shooting Rodgers stated to a fel-
low worker, "He asked for it and he got it.'' Rodgers fled 
the scene and was apprehended peacably in Cortez, Colo-
rado. 
Now, Doctor, assuming those facts, do you have an 
opinion concerning the mental condition of the Defendant 
at the time of the shooting as it wa~ recited in the hypoth-
etical question? 
A. Yes. My opinion is that Mr. Rodgers was suffering 
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from central nervous system lues. Was suffering from a 
paranoid condition. Was psychotic and acted in a compul-
sive manner were he driven 'from within, had to carry out 
this action against the Deceased. 
Q. At the tbne of the shooting as related in this hy· 
pathetical question, do you have an opinion concerning 
whether the Defendant had any control over his actions 
or impulses? 
A. I feel that he, all of his control was taken from him 
in terms of the organic lues change, and on the basis of 
this compulsion to shoot this man. 
Q. Was the Defendant at that time acting under an ir-
restible impulse? 
A. Yes. An irrestible impulse. It was a delusional system 
that impelled him. That made that an irrestible act. 
Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
the mental condition of the Defendant led to or was the 
cause of the shooting? 
A. Yes. I feel it was the mental condition of Mr. Rod-
gers that led to the shooting as it was, well it came about 
through the usual routine of his life. Usual amounts of kid-
ding or whatever happened. This came from within him. 
This was a sickness from within." 
"A. It means that he has an organic condition. 
Q. Of course, Doctor, the fact that he is and has as 
you say or at least in your opinion that he has paranoid 
tendencies doesn't necessarily mean that he doesn't know 
the difference between right and wrong does it? 
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A. No. And I didn't indicate. I think that he does know 
the difference between right and wrong, but that he acted 
from a compulsion. 
Q. Well, does the fact that he is a paranoid necessarily 
mean that he has to act under compulsion all the time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You say that definitely, yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do all paranoids act under compulsion all the time? 
A. All paranoids are acting on a delusional system. Their 
actions are governed. This is an abnormal condition and 
their actions are governed." 
"Q. Doctor, you stated that the Defendant in your opin-
ion is paranoid with psychotic delusions, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that a mild or severe condition? 
A. I think it is always a severe condition. 
Q. Is the Defendant's case severe? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Also you have referred to something called lues. Is 
that the same as syphilis? 
A. That is syphilis. 
The State called as a rebuttal witness to the evidence 
offered by the Defendant on the question to the Defendant's 
sanity, Dr. William D. Pace, who had examined the Defend· 
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ant on behalf of the State. With the rexception of the test-
imony by Dr. Pace with reference to his qualification as 
an expert, we quote the entire tes,timony given by Dr. Pace 
for the purpose of demonstrating that to the· extent of the 
examination made by him, no conflict exists between his 
testimony and the testimony of the Witnesses testifying 
on behalf of the Defendant with respect to the question of 
the Defendant's sanity. We believe that the testimony of 
Dr. Pace patently shows that his examination was perfunc-
tory, superficial and without sufficient inquiry into the 
condition of the Defendant, and without any inquiry into 
the possibility o.f an organic mental disease. Beginning at 
page 270, line 29 of the transcript, we quote as follows: 
"Q. Do you, Doctor, do you know the Defendant in this 
case, James W. Rodgers? 
A. Yes I do. 
Q. And have you ever had an occasion to make an ex-
amination of him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did that examination take place? 
A. That took place on the 8th and 9th of September 
in Salt Lake City. 
Q. And about how long did you spend with him on each 
of those days, September 8th and 9th? 
A. Approximately an hour each day. 
Q. And what was the nature of your examination, 
Doctor? 
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A. I made a psychiatric examination. An interview type 
of examination, asking questions regarding his history, 
family history. His personal history, medical history, that 
sort of thing. And also asking certain questions for the pur-
pose of arriving at an opinion of his mental condition. 
Q. Now, Doctor, from this examination that you con-
ducted on those two days were you able to arrive at an opin-
ion regarding his mental condition? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And will you tell us what that opinion is? 
A. My opinion was that he was not mentally ill or psy-
chotic, or insane would be the legal word for it. That he 
did not show abnormal personality traits or character 
traits which would i nmy opinion place him in the category 
of psychopathic personality. 
Q. And could you describe this psychopathic personality 
for us? That is, what type of person is a psychopathic per-
son? 
A. A psychopathic personality tends to be a person that 
tolerates frustration very poorly, that reacts against others 
in the environment as a result of the inner conflict or frus-
trations. They can be people that are, that tolerate authority 
poorly. That are egocentric. That have little feeling for oth-
ers. That fail to learn certain things from experience. They 
repeat certain types of behavior after the average person 
will learn that it didn't pay to do so. 
Q. And did you find in your examination, Doctor, or 
could you establish any opinion as to whether or not he was 
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suffering from any mental disease? 
A. My opinion was that he was not suffering from a 
mental disease; that this represented abnormal personality 
traits or character traits rather than a definite mental 
illness. 
Q. Now, Doctor, if you were to learn that this same man, 
assuming that you were to learn that this same man had had 
a sample taken of his spinal fluid and that it was tested on 
two occasions, once when tested it was. a two plus and on the 
other occasion it was a three plus. Do you think that would 
have any bearing on your opinion or change it in any way? 
A. Not just that fact wouldn't change it. 
Q. Now, Doctor, I am going to put to you a hypothetical 
question. Let us assume, Doctor, that Mr. Rodgers, the man 
you examined, had had the spinal testis made and the results 
were as I just stated to you, that is one a two positive and 
one a three positive, and those tes~s were taken in November 
of this year, and let's assume, Doctor, that he was working at 
what is called the Rattlesnake Pit Mine here in LaSal 
County. That he worked there about eight months prior to 
June 19, 1957, and that on one occasion, that is he worked 
with other men there, and on one occasion one of his fellow 
workmen, Dee Gardner, who is a truck loader, had some 
kind of an argument with him and Mr. Rodgers had struck 
him at some time during that period of time. And let's 
further assume that some time during that prior eight 
months to June 19th he had some altercation with a Mr. 
Goodnight, or some disagreement or argument over the 
dumping of some ore, and that Mr. Rodgers had apologized 
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later for what was said in the altercation and Mr. Good-
night stated, "I'll accept your apology, but I won't forget 
it." And then let's assume that on three or four occasions 
during that time he had bragged at least to one individual 
about things that the individual didn't know whether they 
were true or not and that this Mr. Rodgers was teased and 
ribbed in the normal amount that a group of men will on 
the job, and that on or about June 1st Mr. Rodgers had an 
altercation with one Charles Merrifield in which there was 
an argument over whether some equipment had been greas-
ed or not and during the course of that Mr. Merrifield had 
called Mr. Rodgers a damn liar. And then let's assume that 
on June the 18th, 1957, that Mr. Rodgers had said to one 
'Dhomas Thompson that• he, Rodgers understood that Mr. 
Merrifield was going to pick a beef with him and if he 
did he'd be ready for him. And then let's assume that on 
June 19th that Mr. Rodgers was working here in the pit 
mine with other men and that during the course of the 
work he had said to one Dennis Ingraham •.hat he was 
going to have to kill Charles :Merrifield before he left, mean-
ing Mr. Merrifield left the job. And that he also said that 
Mr. Merrifield had been talking about me and calling me 
something about Boss Jim. And that Mr. Rodgers further 
said to Mr. Ingraham that he was going to get his gun. That 
he then got in his truck and left the pit. Went down some 
four hundred yards to his own truck and got a pistol out 
of the truck, which was loaded. And drove back into the pit 
and that during this time his demeanor was as usual ac-
cording to the men who ''"orked with him. That he parked 
the truck and got out. He walked directly toward the shovel 
that Mr. Merrifield was operating and stood and waited for 
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Mr. Merrifield to finish loading a dumpster which he was 
loading. That during this time he took out his cigarettes 
and lit one and stood and smoked it. That when the dump-
ster pulled out that Mr. Merrifield was continuing to work 
with the shovel. That Mr. Rodgers took the gun out of his 
belt, fired a shot into the ground. That Mr. Merrifield look-
ed at Mr. Rodgers, at which time Mr. Rodgers motioned for 
him to come to him. T·hat then Mr. Merri-field throttled 
down the shovel, set the bucket half way in the air, and 
turned and stood up in the door, at which time Mr. Rodgers 
shot in a rapid burst of shots and hit Mr. Merrifield six 
times. And that as a result Mr. Merrifield died. That Mr. 
Rodgers then put the gun back in his belt, wa~ out of the 
pit in the normal demeanor, saying to one of his fellow 
workmen, "He had it coming. He asked for it and he got it." 
That he then went to his pickup, drive up to his trailer, 
loaded up his equipment and then left the scene and was 
apprehended later in, near Cortez, Colorado. Now, Doctor, 
if we assume all of those facts could you give us an opinion 
as to whether or not you feel the man we have been talking 
about here in this question knew the difference between 
right and wrong at the time he shot the gun? 
A. My opinion - First let me ask the beginning of that 
question. You mentioned two plus and three plus. 
Q. Yes. 
A. I assume you meant to say Wasserman reaction for 
syphilis. 
Q. Well, these were spinal. 
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A. Yes spinal, but it was a simple test for syphilis 
was it? 
Q. Yes. 
A. My opinion would be that he did know the differ-
ence between right and wrong. 
Q. And, Doctor, from that would you have an opinion 
as to whether or not he knew the nature of the act that he 
was doing? 
A. I think that he did know the nature of the act that 
he was doing. 
Q. And, Doctor, would you have an opinion as to wheth-
er or not he was acting under uncontrollable impulses as 
a result of mental disease? 
A. My opinion would be that he did not control his im-
pulses but that it was not from mental disease. 
MR. BUNNELL: I believe that's all Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. REYNOLDS: 
Q. Doctor, would it be fair to say that mental disorders 
can be broadly classified into organic mental disorders and 
functional mental disorders? 
A. Yes that would be a fair statement. 
Q. And they sometimes overlap don't they? 
A. Yes they do. 
Q. They fit in together. I mean they can have both 
simoultaneously? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. What are some of the examples of organic dis-
order, Doctor? 
A. Oh, such things as mental disorders resulting from 
senile changes in the brain or arterioscerotic changes in the 
brain, or some instances brain tumors or in some instances 
syphilitic infections of the central nervous system. There 
are others. 
Q. Syphilis is, has been referred to by some medical 
people as a great imitator has it not? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And among some of the diseases that, will you name 
some of the diseases that it does imitate. 
A. Oh, in certain instances types of syphilis can imitate 
gastro intestinal disorders of other types. Or skin lesions 
such as eczema or other rashes. Or some instances it can 
somewhat imitate other mental illnesses such as schizo-
phrena or manic stages. Manic depressive or manic, types 
of manic depressive phychoses. 
Q. Then when it is localized in the nervous system, 
why then it would be affecting to the brain, isn't that 
correct? 
A. If an infection progresses to a certain point it does. 
Or it can. 
Q. And when it does that sometimes it can imitate the 
paranoic person? 
A. To some degree yes. 
Q. And the, what are some of the symptoms of the 
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paranoid~ that the paranoid exhrbits, Doctor? 
A. You are referring to paranoid schizophenia or what? 
Q. Well somebody with a paranoid personality what 
would you say. I don't know the medical terms as well as you 
do I'm sure. 
A. I think the word paranoid refers to tendencies to-
ward being suspicious or projecting ones difficulties on 
others, or feelings of being wronged or discriminated 
against. Sometimes it reaches the point of actual delusions. 
Q. And sometimes it takes on the nature of a bragging 
type of person? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A braggart? 
A. Yes, that could be. 
Q. Talk about the machinery that they had operated 
or the mine that they had owned or sometimes as much as 
being President of the United States and things like that 
don't they? 
A. Not the word paranoid. I think what you are refer-
ring to ow would be a paraoid delusion of a grandiose type. 
Q. But these people you said were suspicious, jealous? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That would be fair to say? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And isn't it sometimes true, Doctor, that when these 
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suspiciOns converge on some individual that it is serious 
from the point of view of physical danger to this particu-
lar person? 
A. Possibly, yes. 
Q. What are the usual tests given to determine wheth-
er a person ·has syphilis of the spinal nervous system, 
Doctor? 
A. Spinal fluid examination, neurological examination. 
Q. Neurological? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And also psychological examination? 
A. Not to determine syphilis. 
Q. Well from a psychological examination couldn't you 
get some indication that a man may have some organic 
degeneration of the brain? 
A. You could get some indication as to organic 
changes but not as to specifically which. 
Q. Well did you when you examined Mr. Rodgers here, 
did you find any evidence at all of any organic disorder? 
A. No I didn't. 
Q. Did you notice any slurring of speech, for example, 
which might have shown you that he was inarticulate and 
that he couldn't talk properly which might indicate an 
organic disorder? 
A. I didn't notice anything unusual about his speech. 
He talked very freely. 
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Q. He talked freely, but I meant by that did you 
notice any slurring of the words that he used? 
A. I didn't notice any. 
Q. Was there anything else that was brought out in 
your examination that would indicate any possibility of 
organic trouble in this man's mind? 
A. No, I saw nothing whatever that would indicate or-
ganic changes in the central nervous system. 
Q. Now if this man exhibited such things as suspicion 
and was a braggart and has a persecution complex wouldn't 
that in itself indicate that he might possibly !\~ve syphilis? 
A. He wasn't bragging in the examination. 
Q. I didn't ask you that though, Doctor. I asked you if 
a man exhibited suspicion and things of that kind wouldn't 
it be indicative of the possibility of syphilis? 
A. That would be one possibility. There would be many 
others. 
Q. Yes, if a man, in other words if he exhibited the 
things that, in his examination that you pointed out here a 
few minutes ago about having these, having these suspi-
cions and having a psychopathic personality and poor tol-
erance for frustration, wouldn't t:Jtose things in themselves 
indicate from what you know about syphilis being the great 
imitator that it might, that he might possibly have syphilis? 
A. The personal history that he gave to me did not in-
dicate t·hat he had, that his behavior since cildhood was the 
result of syphilis. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
85 
Q. The indications, now I think you testified here a few 
minutes ago that when you examined him he, and gave him 
your psychiatric examination you noticed that he had a 
psychopathic personality, he had a low tolerance for frus-
tration, that he had exhibited some evidences of suspicious 
nature. Now aren't those things in and of themselves an 
indication that he might have had syphilis? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Q. Well you stated here a few minutes ago, I believe 
that, if I am not mistaken, that syphilis can imitate any-
thing and that those are some of the chracteristics that 
syphilitics sometimes exhibit. 
A. It would be possible for syphilitic to exhibit those 
things without having anything particularly wrong with 
the central nervous system. 
Q. When did you examine the patient, Doctor? 
A. September 8th and 9th. 
Q. This year? 
A. Yes, this year. 
Q. Where? 
A. Salt Lake County Jail 
Q. How long did your examination take? 
A. Approximately one hour each day. 
Q. What kind of examination did you conduct? Was it 
confined exclusively to a psychiatric examination? 
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A. That's right. 
Q. Is that just interviewing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The patient? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Doctor, what you have said here I believe is 
that with all of your knowledge and understanding about 
syphilis, particularly after examining this man and noticing 
that he had a psychopathic personality and low tolarance of 
frustration, would you recommend a neurological examina-
tion? 
A. I was asked to make a psychiatric examination of 
him. 
Q. Now Doctor, if you will -
A. And I arrived at a psychiatric opinion of his condi-
tion and felt that there was no, that the picture that was 
presented psychiatrically was clear cut. 
Q. Did you recommend a neurologic examination? 
A. I made no recommendation. 
Q. Did you make any recommendation that the man 
have a spinal test made on him? 
A. No I didn't." 
In addition to the testimony given by the expert med-
ical witnesses with respect to the mental condition of the 
Defendant, see page 48, line 30, page 49, lines 1 through 5 of 
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the transcript as testified to by Dennis Ingram, a witness for 
the State. And when the same.Witness, Dennis Ingram, was 
called on behalf of the Defendant his testimony reflected the 
fact that the Defendant was a braggart, was "high temper-
ed." See page 158 of the transcript, lines 1 througih 25, page 
159 of the transcript, lines 28 to 30, page 160, lints 1 to 7 page 
161, lines 11 to 15. And, it is also apparent from the testi-
monygiven by the witnesses for the State that the Defendant 
had a "low tolerance for frustration" for he had had alter-
cations with two of the witnesses who testified on behalf 
of the State, one Dee Gardner and one Bobby Goodnight. 
See page 69 lines 2 to 16 and page 70 lines 2 to 10. See also 
page 103 lines 28 to 30 and page 104 lines 1 to 19. In addi-
tion, it is apparent that the Defendant had had altercation 
with the deceased, Charles Merrifield. See page 4 7 lines 18 
to 19, page 82 lines 28 to 30, page 83 lines 1 to 23, page 155 
lines 24 to 30, page 156 lines 1 to 30, page 157 lines 1 to 6. 
Finally, although there is no evidence other than the in-
ference to be drawn from what the defendant told Dennis 
Ingram just prior to the fatal incident, it seems obvious 
that Merrifield had said something to two of the witnesses 
who appeared at the trial to the effect that he would tell 
Jim Rodgers if they didn't off their tail and go to work. 
See page 86 lines 10 to 30, page 87 lines 1 to 15. 
We point out the foregoing facts which were establish-
ed at the trial of this matter not for the purpose of even 
suggesting that if the Defendant had been ribbed, teased 
and tormented that such fact would justify his killing 
Charles Merrifield. The purpose of pointing out the facts 
relative to the bragging and the difficulty which the De-
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fendant had with his fellow employees is simply for 
the purpose oi emphasizing the peculiar behavior oi the 
Defendant. Witness the fan incident as testified to by Bobby 
Goodnight, see page 107 lines 26 to 30, page 108 lines 1 to 8. 
W~e believe that the evidence concerning Defendant's brag-
ging and grandiose at~itude, the evidence of difficulty with 
several people at the Continental Mine, the evidence of the 
fan incident and in fact, the killing itself without any ap-
parent reason o:r provocation, substantiates and corrobor-
ates the expert evidence offered in the case by Drs. Powell, 
Landward and Nelson. 
From an examination of the statement made by the 
Defendant on June 22, and June 26, which statements were 
offered in evidence by the District Attorney, clearly show 
that the Defendant's version of what occurred during the 
fatal incidenti is an exaggerated interpretation of reality 
and what actually occurred, and, accordingly, further dem-
onstrates the psychotic delusions under which this De-
fendant was suffering at the time of the fatal incident. 
If the jury had performed its duty to follow the law 
and evidence offered in the case, it was dutybound to render 
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Can there be 
any doubt in the mind of any reasonable man that the evi-
dence adduced at the trial of this matter, clearly establishes 
that the Defendant was suffering from a severe organic 
mental disorder characterized by psyc·hotic delusions 
brought on by functional disorders and syphilis of the brain 
and spina1 cord. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should re-
verse the judgment in this case and remove the defendant 
to the District Court with instructions to proceed with a 
sanity hearing for the purpose of having the defendant 
committed to the State Mental Hospital, for the two basic 
reasons set forth below: 
l.The State failed to sufficiently inform the defendant 
of the crime he ·was accused of and the trial Court refused 
to correct this omission of defendant's legal and constitu-
tional rights although timely objections were made thereto. 
2. That there is uncontradicted evidence based on 
scientific facts that the defendant was acting under an ir-
restible impulse because of the organic lues change on 
which point there was no evidence submitted by the State 
to the contrary. The only evidence on the part of the State 
with respect to organic mental disorders of the defendant 
was the statement of Dr. Pace that he was requested to give 
the defendant a psychiatric examination and that he did 
not recommend that any neurological or spinal tests or 
any test at all be given to determine the existence of 
organic mental disorder. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. Reed Reynolds 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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